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Executive Summary 
Transport plays a vital role in every day life. The efficient movement of people and 
goods is an essential part of a productive economy as well as being important for 
social cohesion, health and well-being. Investment or policy intervention in the 
transport system is, therefore, in support of these other wider objectives or to tackle 
externalities such as climate change or congestion. 
The institutional structures underpinning transport have, however, developed around 
modes and networks and around the industries of transport. The arrangements vary 
significantly between modes and, increasingly, across areas. There is a multitude 
of governance networks rather than a single overarching ‘governance of the 
transport system’. This makes it difficult to achieve integrated outcomes. 
The importance of transport to achieving broader societal goals is clearly recognised, 
but the arguments about spending across different areas and between modes can 
be influenced by logics and processes within the transport sector rather being driven 
by how best transport can serve those wider needs. Some of this disconnect is hard-
wired into the institutional structures and governance processes. The ability to 
coordinate a combination of public and private investments to achieve integrated 
outcomes, sometimes across adjacent areas, has been a recognised challenge for 
some time. The institutional landscape has, for the most part, become more 
and not less complex. 
There is a significant diversity in institutional arrangements across the UK, 
particularly between local and national tiers of government. This in part reflects the 
different size of the networks and populations being governed. In Northern Ireland all 
transport is conducted by a national department. In Scotland and Wales the two 
primary tiers are local and national although regional decision-making continues to 
play a role- formally in Scotland. In England there are six different spatial tiers. There 
has been a trend towards layering of institutions over time with some of the change 
coming from outside of transport, for example with Local Enterprise Partnerships and 
City Devolution and growth deals. This sometimes results in misaligned boundaries 
although it has brought together employment, skills and transport in some places. 
The reform of sub-national governance, particularly in England, has for the 
most part added layers to decision-making processes. 
Looking across developments related to all modes and jurisdictions, the following 
key strengths of the governance arrangements were identified: 
• The importance of transport has been recognised in increasing capital 
spending. 
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• Longer-term spending commitments which are in place for road, rail and some 
aspects of urban policy allow for better planning and delivery. 
• Transport for London is recognised as a globally leading urban transport 
authority. Other UK cities are being given more powers and are starting to be 
more ambitious, although it is early in this process to draw conclusions about 
the effectiveness of these initial reforms.  
• Transport markets are professionally regulated with good interoperability and 
safety records across all modes. 
Different key challenges emerged when looking at each of the specific modes 
or networks. Across the whole transport system however, the following 
challenges were identified: 
• Siloes persist between transport and other policy areas so, despite the 
recognition of the broader role of transport, aligning decisions to achieve co-
benefits is not seen to be easy. 
• The current spending pattern distribution will be difficult to maintain with the 
report identifying splits between local and national networks and capital and 
revenue as particular issues. These issues also vary significantly across the 
UK. 
• The transition to an electric vehicle fleet will create a transformation in how we 
pay for motoring. This is a sensitive topic for the general public and politicians 
but avoiding tackling this is likely to increase the pressures on transport 
networks and budgets. 
Factors which seem important to the effective governance of infrastructure 
projects were: 
• Identification of a clear need; 
• Developed consensus across key actors; and 
• A clear funding channel 
The report was also tasked to look ahead to 2040 at how these key governance 
challenges might change as a result of the advent of new technologies such as 
automated vehicles and mobility as a service. The reasons for state 
intervention in transport will remain robust although the smart mobility transition 
changes the rules and networks through which interventions will occur. The 
smart mobility transition is an opportunity to remove or improve some of the 
challenges that the current structures create and to achieve goals which have 
proven to be difficult with the existing technologies, structures and incentives. 
However, doing this will be challenging as the exact timing, speed and nature of 
the changes are unclear. Key challenges include: 
• Ensuring that the transition to new forms of mobility also manages the transition 
of existing modes of transport including issues such as employment and 
socially necessary service provision obligations. 
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• Rethinking and clarifying the role of the state in regulating new mobility 
services, whether that is in a more or less hands-on manner. It is an opportunity 
to simplify some of the boundaries and inconsistencies in the existing 
governance system but also has the potential to layer further complexity into 
the governance environment. 
• Proactively managing the use of roads such that the technologies are bent to 
supporting the achievement of public as well as private objectives. Early 
evidence signals the potential to achieve gains from harnessing the new 
technologies but also risks worsening conditions if the access and use of 
vehicles in the network is not pro-actively managed. 
• The need for clarity over who pays and how we pay for the costs of the 
transition to smart mobility. There are new infrastructures and maintenance 
costs to be paid for and this could be part of a wider discussion about the 
changing ways in which we pay for travel. 
• Revisiting who does what. The evidence points overwhelmingly to an increase 
in complexity in the governance environment, and a requirement for new 
advanced skills in the sector at the same time as there is a declining resource 
base in local and national government to manage this. There are opportunities 
to develop innovative shared services and to pass responsibilities, particularly 
up from the lowest tiers, to steer the transition effectively. 
The experts informing this report suggest that, without clarity about the regulatory 
role of the state and the position of the different authorities in managing different 
parts of the transition, delivering the benefits of smart mobility will be difficult and 
there may be some unwanted and hard-to-manage downsides.  
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1. Background 
This report was commissioned by the Government Office for Science as part of its 
Future of Mobility project. The programme of work was to address the following key 
questions: 
A. Institutional structures: Who are the key actors in the UK landscape for 
transport infrastructure? 
B. Governance and influence: What are the factors affecting influence within the 
UK transport system? 
C. Outcomes: What are the pain points in the decision-making system and what 
works? 
D. What will change looking out to 2040? 
The scope of the work was to look at all modes but to limit consideration to the 
governance of transport within the United Kingdom. This means that for modes with 
significant international components the focus on points of interchange and on 
conventions which also affect travel within the United Kingdom. The work was to look 
at important differences across the four countries of the UK and at differences within 
countries where significant. While we recognise the potential interest in international 
comparators of governance this was out of scope for the study. 
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2. Method  
The approach adopted for this research was desktop review combined with expert 
workshop. Expert reviews were commissioned for each of the topics shown in Table 
1. These can be found in the Technical Annex. The draft findings from the first 11 
topics were set out in an expert workshop held at the National Railway Museum in 
York on 27th November 2017. This workshop served as a validation check of the 
findings and as an opportunity to debate the key pain points and what works. 
Together these form the basis for answering points A to C above.  
Table 1: Expert Reports available in the Technical Annex 
Topic Author Affiliation 
Aviation Dr Lucy Budd Loughborough University 
Bus and Coach Professor Peter 
White 
University of Westminster 
Freight Dr Anthony Whiteing University of Leeds 
Maritime Professor Alf Baird Independent 
Rail Professor Chris 
Nash 
University of Leeds 
Road Dr Phillip Wheat University of Leeds 
Scotland Professor Iain 
Docherty 
University of Glasgow 
Transport for the North Nigel Foster and 
Emma Roberts 
Fore Consulting 
West Yorkshire Combined 
Authority 
Nigel Foster and 
Emma Roberts 
Fore Consulting 
Tees Valley Combined 
Authority 
Nigel Foster and 
Emma Roberts 
Fore Consulting 
Local Transport Professor Greg 
Marsden 
University of Leeds 
Automation Professor Oliver 
Carsten 
University of Leeds 
Urban Futures Professor Iain 
Docherty 
University of Glasgow 
Funding Dr John Nellthorp University of Leeds 
 
The workshop was also used to identify priorities for consideration out to 2040. 
Further think pieces on automation and urban futures were then completed. A further 
workshop on funding hosted by KPMG on 7th December in London, developed a 
funding futures briefing note. These resources all serve to inform bullet point D: 
‘What will change looking out to 2040?’. 
It is not possible, or indeed helpful, within this summary report format to include all of 
the intricacies of the differences in governance approaches modes and jurisdictions. 
We recommend that readers make use of the Technical Annexes in parallel with the 
main report if they would like more detail.  
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3. Institutional structures: Who are the 
key actors in the UK transport 
infrastructure landscape? 
 
The institutional structures underpinning transport have developed around modes 
and networks and around the industries of transport. The arrangements vary 
significantly between modes and, increasingly, across areas. There is a multitude of 
governance networks rather than a single overarching ‘governance of the transport 
system’. The governance arrangements of the main modes are reviewed briefly in 
turn below drawing directly on the expert reports, that are included in full in the 
Technical Annex. 
 
3.1. Aviation 
Aviation is an inherently international mode of transport and, for reasons of public 
safety, national security and global geopolitics, it has been subject to formalised 
international organisation, agreement and regulation since the mid-1940s. The core 
governance structure and regulatory regime for air transport, which includes UK 
domestic operations, is international. A key schematic of the different organisations 
involved at different tiers is shown in Figure 1, with brief descriptions provided below. 
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Figure 1: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Aviation 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations 
Specialized Agency which was established in 1947 within the framework of the 1944 
Chicago Convention. ICAO is concerned with ensuring the safe, orderly and 
sustainable development of international air transport. ICAO works with the 
Convention’s 191 Member States to develop and reach consensus on Standards 
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) concerning aviation safety, security, 
environmental protection, economic efficiency and regulatory compliance that are 
used by individual Member States to ensure their aviation operations conform to 
global norms (ICAO.int, 2017). The UK is an active member of ICAO, and a UK 
representative sits on the 36 member elected Council.  
Within the European Union, the European Commission develops policies of pan-
European standardisation and harmonisation in the areas of commercial air transport 
safety, operations and regulatory compliance. European Regulations and Directives 
address: 
• Common rules for the operation of air services within the single European 
market (Regulation EC 1008/2008).  
• Safety, including accident investigation, airworthiness, and the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and aviation security. 
• Environmental protection and safeguarding (including the Emissions Trading 
System). 
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• Airport slot allocation and ground handling. 
• Air traffic management (ATM), including the creation of a Single European 
Sky (SES). 
• Competition rules, including anti-trust protection and state aid. 
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) is an intergovernmental 
organisation with 44 member states, established in 1955. It aims to harmonise 
aviation policies and practices across Europe, working in partnership with ICAO and 
the EU.  
Eurocontrol – is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1960 as the 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. It is responsible for 
formulating pan-European policy on air navigation, airspace, innovation in ATM and 
environmental performance for its 41 member and 2 Comprehensive Agreement 
States.  
The UK Government Department for Transport (DfT) leads UK negotiations on 
aviation matters at European and international forums, develops UK aviation 
legislation and formulates policy. DfT contains the Air Accident Investigations Branch 
(AAIB), it sponsors the UK’s National Aviation Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA). As the sponsoring department of the CAA, DfT establishes the CAA’s remit, 
legal framework and strategic objectives 
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which commenced work in 1972, is the UK’s 
independent regulator responsible for all civil aviation regulatory functions under UK 
and EU law and international directives. It is the UK’s ‘competent authority’ and a 
public corporation of DfT. The CAA publishes UK aviation legislation (which 
incorporates international and European directives) as CAPs (Civil Aeronautical 
Publications). The CAA’s work is split into the following activities (see CAA, 2010): 
• Corporate functions – including legislation, governance, procurement, aircraft 
registration, charges and statistical returns. 
• Safety Regulation Group (SRG) – responsible for areas including safety 
standards, personnel licensing, medical, airworthiness, safety management 
systems. 
• Consumer Protection Group – responsible for the Air Travel Organiser 
Licence (ATOL) scheme, airline licensing and air passenger rights. 
• Directorate of Airspace Policy – responsibilities include the Single European 
Sky, Instrument Flight Rules, environmental research and radio licences. 
• Economic Regulation Group – responsible for airport slots, NATS and 
economic policy. 
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• Consumer Panel (formerly the Air Transport Users Council) offers an 
independent advisory role and represents the interests of air transport 
consumers. It has no decision-making responsibilities or accountability role. 
NATS (formerly National Air Traffic Services) is the UK’s Air Navigation Service 
Provider responsible for providing en-route air traffic services within UK and North 
Atlantic airspace as well as aerodrome and tower services at 14 UK airports. The 
CAA licenses NATS en-route services and licenses the air traffic controllers it 
employs. The CAA is also responsible for the economic regulation of NATS’ en-route 
and oceanic airspace charges. 
HM Treasury – sets the rates for Air Passenger Duty (APD), which is levied on all 
passenger flights from UK airports. APD rates vary according to the class of travel 
and distance of the destination airport (in miles) from the UK (see Seely, 2016). In 
May 2015 it was announced that APD would be fully devolved to Scotland (ibid, 
2016). 
Some aspects of the 1982 Civil Aviation Act pertaining to aerodromes and some 
parts of the 1986 Airports Act relating to airport byelaws and the transfer of airport 
undertakings of local authorities (LA), Public Service Obligation (PSO) routes and 
APD are devolved to Scotland (see Butcher, 2017). The Air Discount Scheme (ADS) 
is a Scottish Government initiative that operates under the EU’s General Block 
Exemption Regulation (Articles 107 and 108, EC 651/2014) which aims to make air 
services more affordable for remote communities in the Scottish Highlands and 
Islands by providing a 50% discount on the core airfare on eligible routes (see Air 
Discount Scheme, 2017). 
The Welsh Assembly is not permitted to legislate on aviation matters except: 
financial assistance to providers of transport services or facilities; strategies by 
Welsh Ministers or local authorities about the provision of air services; and the 
regulation of the use of aircraft carrying animals for the purposes of protecting 
human, animal and plant health, animal welfare or the environment (see Butcher, 
2017). Northern Ireland has no devolved powers over aviation. 
Local authorities (which may own, in whole or part, the airports within their 
boundaries) are responsible for local planning applications, noise regulations and 
voluntary agreements. 
The Airports Act of 1986 established the legal basis for the privatisation and 
commercialisation of UK airports. The former British Airports Authority (BAA) was 
privatised in 1987 and, along with a mix of other private investors, it has developed 
commercial interests in UK airports. The UK airports with the largest public sector 
stake are: Birmingham (49% owned by seven West Midlands Councils), Manchester 
Airports Group who own Manchester, East Midlands, Bournemouth and London 
Stansted (35.5% Manchester City Council and 29% nine Greater Manchester 
Councils), Cardiff (100% Welsh Assembly Government), Prestwick airport and 
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Highlands and Islands Airport Ltd which operate 11 Scottish airports including 
Inverness (100% Scottish Ministers), and Newcastle (51% owned by seven local 
authorities in North East England) (Butcher, 2016). 
UK-registered airlines provide services for passengers and freight and may seek to 
influence Government policy regarding airport charges, future airport capacity, 
passenger rights and environmental safeguards. UK airlines pay licence fees in 
respect of airframe licensing and their Air Operators Certificates (AoCs) which help 
fund the CAA. 
Investment in new airport capacity and new air services is primarily a matter for the 
private sector. However, successive national governments have developed and 
maintained a national aviation strategy. This reflects the need for capacity 
enhancements in the South East of England, where competing alternatives exist. It 
also reflects the need for quite considerable additional surface transport investment 
(likely to be funded through a mixture of public and private sources) to service new 
capacity, and concerns over environmental degradation. The independent Airports 
Commission reported in July 2015 (Airports Commission, 2015) but there has yet to 
be a decision on new runway capacity. 
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3.2. Maritime 
 
Figure 2: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Maritime 
Transport 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialised agency of the 
United Nations. The IMO sets standards for the safety, security and environmental 
performance of international shipping in areas such as ’ship design, construction, 
equipment, manning, operation and disposal’ and ’Energy efficiency, new technology 
and innovation, maritime education and training, maritime security, maritime traffic 
management and the development of the maritime infrastructure’ (IMO, 2017). 
The European Commission sets out an overarching framework for maritime 
governance, working with the IMO. Specific policy strands for the Commission focus 
on the role of ports within the Trans-European Network and in particular on the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) aimed at the core seaport network. Working with 
the European Investment Bank, the Commission seeks to leverage much larger 
investments from national or local government or the private sector. 
In addition, the Commission’s Motorways of the Seas initiative (European 
Commission, 2017) seeks to promote the use of shipping as an alternative to land 
transport. The Commission is also working to promote a network of liquefied natural 
gas re-fuelling stations at the core maritime ports that make up the Trans-European 
Network, as well as a clean shore-side electricity supply, and tighter rules on 
maritime safety, which is regulated by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA, 
n.d.). 
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DfT describes its main responsibilities under ‘Shipping’ as twofold, namely: overall 
maritime strategy and guidance, and; keeping shipping safe through the Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency (MCA) (National Audit Office 2015). DfT has overall 
responsibility for maritime policy across the UK. Maritime policy is a broad area, in 
addition to shipping, it touches on marine business services like insurance, trade, 
environmental impacts and skills/ recruitment in the sector.  DfT is supported by the 
MCA, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and the General Lighthouse 
Authorities (GLAs) which provide a range of maritime delivery functions on behalf of 
the department (Department for Transport 2015). The MCA is an executive agency 
of DfT whose responsibilities include:  
• providing a 24-hour search and rescue service;  
• enforcing ship safety;  
• preventing pollution;  
• promoting seafarer health;  
• regulating and verifying safety and welfare standards by survey and 
inspection;  
• registering and certificating ships and seafarers; and  
• managing maritime pollution and response.  
The MAIB is an independent unit within DfT which investigates marine accidents 
involving UK-flagged vessels worldwide, and all vessels in UK waters. The GLAs are 
executive non-departmental public bodies responsible for aids to navigation. The 
Canal & River Trust, formerly British Waterways, is responsible for over 2,000 miles 
of navigable rivers and canals in England and Wales 1. In addition, there are several 
other government departments (OGDs), agencies and public bodies with 
responsibility for different aspects of maritime policy (see Figure 3).  Figure 3 dates 
from 2015, but since then there have some changes to government departments, 
such as the amalgamation of DECC and BIS into one department (BEIS), and the 
introduction of a new department in DEXEU (the department for exiting the European 
Union), which are not shown in the figure.   
Transport Scotland has established a directorate for ‘Aviation, Maritime, Freight & 
Canals’ (Transport Scotland 2017c). The directorate works within UK policy 
framework and legislation, tenders subsidised ferry services, and issues small freight 
mode shift grants. Two state-owned entities overseen by the directorate are ferry 
operator Caledonian MacBrayne and port and ferry owner CMAL (Caledonian 
Maritime Assets Ltd) (see below). The directorate administers provisions outlined in 
the Harbours, Pilotage and Ports Acts, as well as any related local legislation, deals 
with applications for Harbour Empowerment and Revision Orders within Scotland, 
and liaises with the UK Marine Management Organisation on issues of common 
interest. There is no distinct ‘Scottish’ maritime policy as such in terms of ensuring 
                                                           
1 https://canalrivertrust.org.uk/ 
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adequate seaport and shipping capacity to serve the needs of the Scottish economy 
(Nicholls, 2017). 
Figure 3: UK Government Maritime Structure (source: Department for 
Transport, 2015) 
The Welsh Assembly Government notes that policy and regulation of most ports in 
Wales is the responsibility of the UK Government2. Part of this was devolved to 
Welsh Ministers from April 2018, notably powers to issue Harbour Revision Orders 
as in Scotland. Major ports in Wales as in the rest of UK are mostly privately owned 
with the remainder owned by self-governing trusts. The Welsh Ports Group is the 
only forum representing the views of the maritime sector in Wales. Coordinated by 
the British Ports Association and the UK Major Ports Group, it holds regular 
meetings with the Welsh Government and key decision-makers across the planning, 
transport, and maritime sectors. Any major transport initiatives must be appraised 
using the WelTAG guidance (Welsh Government, 2017a) at the planning stage, to 
ensure they consider the economy, environment and society. 
Sub-national transport bodies have very little influence over shipping with the 
exception of Transport for London which deals with Thames Clippers and the 
Highlands and Islands Regional Transport Partnership in Scotland which works 
with the local authorities who procure the services. Local Government acts as the 
                                                           
2 http://gov.wales/topics/transport/ports/?lang=en 
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planning authority for ports situated in their area. The key issues of concern 
surrounding port projects usually relate to:  
• national/regional/county planning policy;  
• ports policy (supply/demand and alternative sites);  
• employment;  
• transportation (public/private transport arrangements and road/rail freight 
implications); 
• landscape/ecology; and  
• historic environment (Essex County Council, 2002).  
However, ultimately the decision concerning a Harbour Order is made at 
national/ministerial level. Many local authorities throughout the UK also own ports 
and harbours. This includes one of the largest ferry ports - Portsmouth.  However 
most LA-owned facilities comprise relatively small harbours. In Scotland, a few local 
authorities do own a significant number of ports and piers, mainly used by ferries and 
for fisheries, and some maintain significant maritime assets and services, such as in 
Orkney and Shetland, which have marine departments within the respective council 
structures (Orkney Islands Council, 2018).  
Individual statutory harbour authorities (of which there are several hundred in the 
UK) regulate port and shipping activities and operations within their defined areas of 
jurisdiction. Many of the latter are now privately owned such as the major estuary 
regulating bodies for the Solent, Humber, Mersey, Tees, Forth, Clyde and Tay. 
There are some anomalies, as non-port-owning regulatory trusts continue to operate 
at Harwich Haven and on the Thames.  
Privatisation can occur in three areas for port operation.  This can cover (i) the 
ownership of the land, or just assets such as terminals, (ii) the cargo handling 
functions or (iii) the regulation of the port or waterway.  The first two types of 
privatisation are common in ports across Europe.  Transferring port (authority) 
regulatory functions (as well as port land property rights) to the private sector made 
UK governance of ports significantly different from most other countries where such 
responsibilities are generally retained within the public sector (Baird, 1995). 
UK ports are today predominantly owned by private port companies/groups; 
nine port operators between them own and operate over 40 ports, accounting for 
more than 70% of the total tonnage handled in UK ports (UKMPG, 2018). Self-
governing trust ports account for much of the remaining tonnage, with the balance 
handled by smaller private and local authority owned ports. The largest publicly-
owned shipping operator in the UK is Caledonian MacBrayne (n.d.) which operates 
27 ferry routes in the Clyde and Hebrides.  Its main port supplier and ship provider is 
publicly-owned CMAL (Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd) which owns and operates 
the fleet of 32 ferries and is Statutory Harbour Authority for 16 ports, harbours and 
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slipways across the West of Scotland and the Clyde Estuary (CMAL, 2018). Both 
organisations are owned by Scottish Ministers. 
UK ports are predominantly self-governing and responsible for their own planning, 
development and investment (Monios 2017). Consequently the UK Government 
does not invest in standalone port infrastructure as this is a matter for the individual 
private owners. The recently completed ports connectivity study highlights the 
importance of and need for enabling inland infrastructure (DfT, 2018a). Of the £20 
billion annual DfT spend on transport in 2014/15, 97% went to road and rail, with 
only 3% (some £600 million) left to support ‘other’ modes (i.e. maritime, aviation and 
other). Any enabling investments, such as roads to / from ports are recorded in the 
roads budget, not the maritime one.   
In 2016/17 the devolved Scottish Government spent more on maritime transport (i.e. 
ferries and their piers) than DfT spent for the UK.  This is because the geography of 
Scotland is such that lifeline ferries are needed for its island communities, in ways 
not mirrored in the rest of the UK. In 2016/2017 this amounted to £208 million (£167 
million for ferry operating subsidy and £41 million for capital spend), compared with 
£201 million in 2015/2016 (Auditor General 2017).  
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3.3. Rail 
The national rail network of Great Britain comprises 15,799 route-km, and currently 
carries around 65 billion passenger-km and 18 billion tonne-km per annum (TSGB 
2016). It should be noted that the arrangements relating to the small rail network in 
Northern Ireland are totally different from those of the rest of the UK. Northern 
Ireland Railway has a route length of 362km and carries around 400 million 
passenger-km annually and is not covered further in the main report. Key actors at 
different tiers are shown in Figure 4. By contrast to aviation and maritime, where 
global and European influences are very strong, the UK Government and national 
actors are more important to the rail industry. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Rail 
 
The European Union intervenes extensively in the rail sector, most notably through 
its four railway packages of Directives, which require amongst other things: 
• Access to the rail network by all licensed freight and international passenger 
operators (from 2020 this will be extended to domestic passenger) 
• From 2022, competitive tendering for public service contracts 
• Creation of an independent regulator to ensure non-discrimination in pricing 
track access and allocation of capacity 
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• Arrangements, either through regulation or multi-annual contracts with the 
government, to bring pressure on the infrastructure manager to reduce costs 
and charges while ensuring that an efficient infrastructure manager is able to 
finance its activities 
• Following standard European Technical Standards for Interoperability in all 
investments (although because of its particular situation as an island with only 
two direct rail links with other EU member states the UK has negotiated 
derogation from some of these provisions). 
Except for those relating to interoperability, these provisions have had little influence 
in Britain, because Britain was generally already complying with them before the 
legislation was passed. The EU also contributes funding towards the planning and 
execution of rail projects on the designated trans-European rail network, although for 
Western European countries the proportion of cost contributed is generally small. 
Figure 5 shows an overview of the rail industry and the key actors involved. The 
national rail network (including not just track, structures and signalling but also 
stations and many maintenance facilities and freight terminals) is owned, maintained 
and operated by Network Rail.  The only significant exception is the high-speed line 
from London to the Channel Tunnel, which is privately owned although still 
maintained and operated by Network Rail. Until 2014, Network Rail was regarded as 
a private sector company limited by guarantee, with members including the 
government, train operators and general representatives of the public. However, in 
that year the Office of National Statistics ruled that, as its debts were guaranteed by 
the government, Network Rail should be regarded as a government-owned 
company.  
This has led to significant changes in the institutional structure. Prior to 2014, 
Network Rail was regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation (since renamed the 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR)) and borrowed on the open market, with government 
guarantee. Now, although ORR continues to have significant regulatory 
responsibilities for Network Rail, it is also monitored and supervised directly by the 
Department for Transport and is only allowed to borrow from the government, which 
itself sets borrowing limits (Bowe, 2015). DfT now approves and monitors 
enhancement projects directly rather than through the periodic review, taking 
account of advice from the National Infrastructure Commission. Other bodies may 
contribute to investment costs; for instance train operators, local enterprise 
partnerships and the Welsh Assembly. For some very large investments (HS2, 
Crossrail and East-West Rail) separate companies have been set up to plan and 
deliver them. 
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Figure 5: Overview of the Rail Industry (NAO, 2015) 
Responsibility for both franchising and infrastructure spending in Scotland is now 
devolved to the Scottish Government. There is currently no such arrangement in 
Wales; although the Welsh Assembly does play a major role in specifying services 
and managing the franchise, DfT remains the franchising authority (Champion, 
2016a). However, it is intended that the next franchise for Welsh passenger services 
will be fully devolved to the Welsh Assembly and will include control of and 
investment in infrastructure on the Welsh Valleys commuter lines near Cardiff.  
Otherwise, the Welsh government sets out its priorities and prepares business plans 
for rail infrastructure investment but largely in an advisory capacity (Champion, 
2016b). The Welsh Assembly does have powers to invest in rail infrastructure which 
it uses on a relatively small scale (for instance to improve stations). 
Sub-national government has a varied role in rail planning. Rail North, has also 
been set up to work jointly with DfT as being responsible for specifying, awarding 
and managing rail franchises in the North of England. Rail North is now being 
merged into Transport for the North (discussed in section 4.2.1). Passenger 
franchises in London and Merseyside have been fully devolved to Transport for 
London and Merseyside Combined Authority respectively, but this does not include 
responsibility for infrastructure. In all metropolitan areas, Passenger Transport 
Authorities or their equivalent are responsible for producing local transport plans, as 
are county councils elsewhere, and these may make recommendations regarding rail 
infrastructure. Local government (and LEPs through the capital budgets they hold) 
play a part in financing small rail infrastructure projects such as new stations. 
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The national rail regulatory body is ORR which is responsible for monitoring the 
performance of Network Rail, enforcing licence conditions and determining Network 
Rail funding and required outputs through the periodic review. Regulation is divided 
into five year control periods. Each control period starts with DfT publishing a 
statement of funds available (SOFA) and a High Level Output Specification (HLOS), 
while the Rail Delivery Group RDG publishes an Initial Industry Plan (IIP) and 
Network Rail a schedule of proposed Track Access Charges. It is the responsibility 
of ORR to consider these documents, to check their consistency and to produce a 
settlement which determines Network Rail regulatory outputs, charges and other 
funding. In doing this, it is required to regard the SOFA as binding, so that required 
outputs must be adjusted to fit the funds available.  
In the current periodic review, due for completion in 2018 (PR18), the process has 
changed substantially, in that the HLOS only covers requirements concerning 
maintenance, renewals and operations, and not enhancement. Enhancement 
projects will be considered by DfT as and when they are fully specified and the 
business case completed. This is in response to problems in the last periodic review, 
when a number of projects were added in before they had been fully prepared, and 
this led to substantial overspending on budget (Bowe, 2015). But it does represent a 
substantial shift of control from ORR to DfT. 
Passenger trains are operated by private sector train operating companies, mainly 
under franchises awarded by DfT; freight trains are operated by private companies 
on a purely commercial basis, as are a small number of open access passenger 
services. In general, train operators are not directly involved in providing and 
maintaining infrastructure, although they do sometimes contribute directly to 
investment costs and this is a development likely to be encouraged in the future 
(Hansford, 2017). Passenger operators do lease passenger stations and 
maintenance depots, and undertake some investment in passenger facilities, car 
parks etc. and freight operators often own freight terminals, while some other freight 
and maintenance depots are privately owned. In general, investment in freight 
terminals is a private sector activity, although obviously subject to the planning 
process and sometimes in receipt of government grants where they are deemed to 
provide social benefits in terms of reduced congestion and environmental impact by 
diverting traffic from roads.   
Transport Focus is the body formally required to examine rail industry performance 
from the point of view of consumers and to conduct a rolling survey of quality of 
service and passenger satisfaction as well as hearing complaints. It is a non-
departmental public body sponsored by DfT.   
The flows of income and expenditure in the rail industry are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Rail Industry Income and Expenditure (ORR, 2017a) 
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3.4. Road 
A simplified structure of the key governance actors by tier is shown in Figure 7. 
European funding for the Trans-European Network has generally been a small 
contribution to investments. The European Union has had a more important role in 
the setting of emission standards and harmonising new technology standards which 
could be important for increasingly autonomous vehicles. It also plays a role in the 
freight industry on matters such as working time, but these are covered in section 3.6 
of this report. This section focuses on road infrastructure investment and 
management.  
 
Figure 7: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Road 
 
In Great Britain the ownership and management of roads is divided into two: 
1. Strategic roads, which cover motorways and ‘trunk’ roads. Trunk roads are 
roads which are classed as strategic routes. These are owned and managed 
by Highways England in England, Transport Scotland in Scotland and the 
Welsh Government in Wales.  
2. Local roads, which cover the remaining roads in public ownership. They are 
owned and managed by Local Authorities in England, Scotland and Wales.  
In Northern Ireland ownership and management of all public roads falls to the 
Department for Infrastructure. 
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Table 2: Road Lengths by Country and Road Type 
Nation Strategic Road 
Length (kms)  
Local Road 
length (kms) 
Total 
England 7,100 296,300 303,400 
Scotland  3,200 56,100 59,400 
Wales 1,700 32,200 33,900 
Northern Ireland 1,200 24,400 25,600 
Source: DfT (2017a) and DfI (2017, 2014) for Northern Ireland  
In terms of strategic roads there is a distinction between England, where Highways 
England is a separate government-owned company and Wales and Scotland where 
strategic roads are managed by a government agency. Thus, in England the 
Strategic Roads infrastructure manager is at arm’s length from central government. 
This in turn gives rise to the need for more involved governance structures as shown 
in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Governance arrangements for Highways England (source: Office of 
Rail and Road (2017b)) 
In England, the Department for Transport ’sets the government’s strategic goals for 
the road network; approves the five-yearly Road Investment Strategy, and holds 
Highways England’s Board to account for its governance of the Company and its 
delivery of the strategy.’ (NAO, 2017). The Road Investment Strategy is the process 
by which the maintenance and investment plans of Highways England for a five-year 
period are approved by the Secretary of State for Transport. The process is similar to 
that in rail in the sense that there is an interplay between the infrastructure manager 
who proposes plans (see section 3.4), the Department for Transport which funds 
plans and the Highways Monitor which advises the Secretary of State on the viability 
of the plans.  
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The Office of Rail and Road has a function of Highways Monitor. It has to: 
• Monitor performance against the investment plan, performance specification 
and other benchmarks 
• Advise the Secretary of State on the development of the Road Investment 
Strategy including what efficiencies could be anticipated 
• Require improvements and potentially levy fines for delivery problems (ORR, 
2017b). 
As such, the Highways Monitor is not an economic regulator. It has limited powers 
and primarily operates as an advisor to the Secretary of State. However, to 
discharge this advisory role it has to undertake similar exercises, such as 
performance benchmarking, as it would if it was as an independent economic 
regulator.  
There is no directly equivalent body for Scotland and Wales given the agency 
structure. Both the Welsh Audit Office and Audit Scotland do have a general 
oversight role of government spending in the respective jurisdictions. Transport 
Scotland has a long-term strategic plan and major scheme prioritisation process (see 
section 4.2.2 and Technical Annex section 2.1). 
Sub-national bodies have an even more limited role in road than in rail. Transport 
for the North is involved in conducting some road investment studies in an advisory 
capacity. Only Transport for London has its own Strategic Road Network, with local 
roads managed by the London boroughs. 
Local roads are maintained and operated by Local Authorities with highway powers. 
There are 152 in England, 32 in Scotland and 22 in Wales.  Such LAs have a legal 
duty to maintain the highway under section 41 of the Highways Act 1980. To help 
discharge this duty there are standards of repair that they must follow. For local 
highway authorities these are set out in Well-maintained Highways: Code of Practice 
for Highway Maintenance Management, published in July 2005 by the UK Roads 
Liaison Group (UKRLG, 2005). While not a statutory document, it is published with the 
backing of central and local government (UK Parliament, 2016).  
In addition to Highways England, companies are involved in the provision of 
maintenance and investment on both the strategic and local road network. Local 
authorities operate a mix of maintenance delivery models ranging from in-house 
provision to Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) (e.g. Sheffield with Amey). The network 
of Highways England is divided into 12 Contract Areas, operating Managing Agent 
Contracts (MACs). Further, approximately 15% of the Strategic Road Network in 
England is provided via a range of private Design, Build, Finance, and Operate 
(DBFO) concessionaires. An example is the M1/A1 link road (now part of the M1 
J43-47) and the M6 Toll Road. These contracts are typically concession’s lasting 25-
30 years. 
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Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the spend per mile on strategic roads and local roads 
by administration and by region of England for local roads. The spend per mile is at 
least ten times higher on strategic roads for England, Scotland and Wales, but is 
comparable to spending on local roads for Northern Ireland. 
 
Figure 9: Strategic road spend per road mile for strategic roads (£’000). 
(Source: HMT Country and regional analysis: 2017) 
 
Figure 10: Local road spend per mile 2016/17 (£’000). (Source: HMT Country 
and regional analysis: 2017) 
Spending on capital projects, rather than maintenance, for Highways England, is 
anticipated to increase from just above £1 billion per annum in 2012/13 to near £4 
billion per annum by 2020/21 (NAO, 2015). The challenge of managing such a step 
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change in delivery in an efficient manner has been highlighted by the National Audit 
Office (NAO, 2015). 
A variety of sources are used to fund local roads. One of the key issues is that much 
of the funding is not ring-fenced for spending on transport (Table 3) and there 
are concerns over the extent to which this is contributing to a backlog of local road 
maintenance given other local spending pressures.  Industry figures estimate the 
total backlog at £12.06 billion. They estimate the size of backlog is growing; this year 
the shortfall was £730 million (AIA,2017). 
Table 3: Funding sources for local road expenditure in England (Based on 
Mayat (2017) analysis of Kemp (2017) and personal correspondence with DfT) 
Fund Name Description How allocated Ring-fenced for 
highways? 
Integrated 
Transport Block 
For small transport 
improvement projects 
Formula No 
Highways 
Maintenance 
Needs Fund 
To maintain local road 
network 
 
Formula No 
Highways 
Maintenance 
Incentive Fund 
Additional maintenance 
funding based on 
efficiency improvement 
self-assessment 
Formula No 
Highways 
Maintenance 
Challenge Fund 
For projects not possible 
to complete with 
Highways Maintenance 
Needs Fund 
Bidding process No 
Local Growth 
Fund 
For infrastructure to 
support Local Enterprise 
Partnerships’ (LEPs) 
plans to deliver growth 
Bidding process No 
Pothole Action 
Fund 
To repair potholes on 
local roads 
 
Formula  Yes 
NPIF  Focus on housing 
growth and removing 
barriers to productivity 
growth 
Bidding process No 
Safer Roads 
NPIF 
To make the 50 most 
dangerous sections of 
the local road network 
safer 
Targeted funding No 
Resilient Roads To repair flood damaged 
roads and to make the 
network more resilient 
Targeted funding No 
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3.5. Bus 
The bus and coach industry serves a wide range of functions, notably: 
1. Provision of ‘local’ bus services, i.e. those corresponding to the general 
concept of ‘buses’, calling at closely-spaced kerbside stops, handling mostly 
short-distance passenger movement. Each passenger pays a separate fare 
(although not necessarily in cash; could be by smartcard or display of a pass).  
2. Operation of contract services, where the entire vehicle is hired out to an 
individual or organisation, and separate fares are not collected from 
passengers. The principal example is school travel, in which local authorities 
meet their statutory obligations to provide free travel above specified 
distances by hiring- in vehicles from licensed operators. 
3. Excursions and tours.  
4. Express services. Where all passengers are carried a distance of at least 15 
miles measured in a straight line, no service registration is required, but a 
fixed timetable is usually operated. Separate fares are charged for each 
passenger. 
This section focuses largely on ‘local’ bus services. Around 5,000 million trips are 
made per year on such services. Such services must be registered with the regional 
Traffic Commissioners. Most services outside London and Northern Ireland (about 
84% of bus-km in 2015-16) are registered ‘commercially’ (see below), the balance 
being on contracted services. A simplified map of actors by tier of governance is 
shown below in Figure 11. 
Governance of UK Transport Infrastructures 
34 
 
 
Figure 11: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Bus 
The EU provides a number of common regulations, in particular those affecting 
environmental standards for new vehicles (currently Euro VI), rules affecting drivers’ 
hours of work (for services whose length exceeds 50 km), and the operator licensing 
system, notably in respect of financial resources per vehicle. It also provides a 
framework for international services, and competitive tendering. However, member 
states vary greatly in the degree of quantity and price regulation for local buses, and 
whether to permit scheduled express coach services. 
The UK Government provides most of the statutory framework for the industry and 
other tiers of government. In the absence of a separate English administration, it also 
exercises power directly in that case.  Given the limited ability of local government to 
raise finance directly, its financial resources are also determined to a large extent 
through grants made from the UK central government revenues. This has even 
applied historically to the devolved national governments, although they now have 
wider tax-raising powers. The UK Government also sets taxes applicable to bus and 
coach operations (fuel duty, vehicle excise duty). 
The legislative framework for the bus and coach sector is set by central 
governments, principally that in Westminster, but also those in Cardiff and 
Edinburgh. Education legislation is of particular importance, requiring local education 
authorities to provide free transport above specified distances between home and 
the nearest suitable school (two miles up to age eight, three miles above this). This 
forms a large part of the transport-related expenditure for rural authorities, and of 
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income to operators in such areas. Central legislation also requires local authorities 
to provide free concessionary travel for disabled users, and to those in older age 
groups. The age eligibility and compensation mechanisms and rates differ between 
England, Scotland and Wales.  
At present, the legislative framework within Wales and Scotland is similar to that in 
England, but more variation is likely to emerge, as the Bus Services Act 2017 is 
largely applicable only within England. Differences in concessionary fares and bus 
operator grants are discussed below. 
At present, the main exceptions to the broad patterns described are London and 
Northern Ireland. Within London, while the operator licensing system applies (see 
below), Transport for London (TfL) procure the great majority of services through 
contracts with operators, and also acts as regulatory authority for the others, through 
issue of London Service Permits. Within Northern Ireland, a very different structure 
from the rest of the UK applies, with a more restrictive licensing system (even for 
express services) and most scheduled services are provided by publicly-owned 
near-monopolies. 
Within England, the principal bus roles are the county level in two-tier authorities, 
but where unitary authorities exist they have these responsibilities, which can create 
some co-ordination issues. Within the six metropolitan areas outside London (such 
as the West Midlands, focussed on Birmingham) wider powers were given by the 
Local Transport Act 2008, the Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) being 
renamed Integrated Transport Authorities (ITAs). Other sub-national decision-making 
bodies have limited influence. In addition to the direct powers and responsibilities 
related to bus services described above, local authorities also have considerable 
influence on other issues likely to affect bus performance, in particular in their role as 
highway and traffic management bodies, and in relation to parking policy and 
provision of bus priorities.  
Discretionary powers exist for support of non-commercial local bus services through 
tendering, but there is no particular service level stipulated. In practice, given the 
pressures of mandatory spending on school travel and concessionary fares, some 
authorities have eliminated such spending altogether (e.g. Cumbria, Oxfordshire, 
Southend). Overall tendered bus-km in Britain outside London fell from a peak of 514 
million in 2009/10, to 310 million in 2015/16 (i.e. by 40%). ‘Commercial’ bus-km rose 
marginally from 1,627 to 1,650 million over the same period3.    
Regulation in the bus industry largely relates to the quality (especially safety) of 
services, as distinct from ‘quantity’ regulation (limiting the total scale of operation, 
usually by route licensing) and price regulation – these last two aspects were largely 
abolished outside London and Northern Ireland under the Transport Act 1985. Each 
                                                           
3 DfT Table BUS0205b ‘Vehicle kilometres on local bus services by metropolitan area status and 
country, and service type: Great Britain, annual from 1987/88 
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Public Service Vehicle (PSV) operator, i.e. of bus and coach service vehicles, is 
required to hold an ‘Operator Licence’ (or ‘O-licence’). This is awarded to an operator 
deemed fit to run a specified number of vehicles by the regional Traffic 
Commissioner. For this purpose, Wales4 and Scotland each have their own 
Commissioner, while England is divided into several regions. The licence specifies 
the number of vehicles permitted to be operated at any one time (by issue of discs), 
determined primarily by the operator’s ability to safely maintain their fleet. There are 
also financial requirements (working capital per vehicle) imposed by EU regulations. 
The Commissioner may vary the number of discs, or cancel a licence entirely where 
operation is unsatisfactory.  
In recent years, the Commissioners have also placed increased emphasis on 
operators running according to their service registrations, as reliability is a very 
important consideration from the passenger’s viewpoint. The expected standard is 
generally set that at least 95% of journeys should run not more than 1 minute earlier 
or 5 minutes late, although discretion may be exercised in applying this (Forster, 
2015). A Commissioner may impose a penalty per vehicle operated. 
The Competition and Markets Authority, which replaced the former Competition 
Commission, and the Office of Fair Trading, applies competition policy to the bus 
and coach industry within Britain. It has a particular role in determining whether 
agreements relating to fares and ticketing might be deemed anti-competitive, and 
also has powers to investigate mergers and other forms of anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
The great majority of the industry in mainland Britain is in private ownership. 
This has always been the case for the contract and private hire market, but public 
sector operators dominated in the scheduled local and express services prior to 
1985. Ten local authority-owned urban operations continue in business as ‘arm’s 
length’ companies. Creation of further such operations in England is specifically 
prohibited under the Bus Services Act 2017. There are also some small local 
authority-owned operations for specialised school and/or rural services. 
Within the private sector, five groups dominate the market (Stagecoach, First, Go 
Ahead, National Express, Arriva), comprising about 70% of local bus turnover.  The 
first four of these are PLCs on the UK stock market. There are some other 
substantial regional companies, two of which may be traced back to management 
buy-outs of National Bus Company subsidiaries, but most of the ‘independent’ 
private sector operators are relatively small, with a large number running under ten 
(see Technical Annex). 
                                                           
4 A useful illustration of the role of a Commissioner may be found in the commentary from Nick Jones, 
the Traffic Commissioner for Wales, in Bus Users Cymru 2016-17, Annual report on activities, 
achievements and progress, pp 34-36 
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The most comprehensive statutory representation within England is that provided by 
London TravelWatch, covering all modes of public transport within the Greater 
London area, also including taxis. Transport Focus provides a body for representing 
bus user interests outside London, and has a particularly important role in carrying 
out regular large-scale surveys of user satisfaction by bus in many areas (now also 
extended to Scotland). These may have influenced operators’ policies, for example, 
in respect of fare levels (White, 2017). At a local level, many issues are dealt with 
directly by operators themselves, with Bus Users UK acting as a non-statutory body 
in representing their interests. A Bus Appeals Board acts a point of appeal where 
users are not satisfied with responses by operators to complaints.  
Substantial funding for buses with reduced emissions has been provided through the 
Green Bus funds, both in England and Scotland (there is no equivalent scheme in 
Wales). This has included, for example, the difference in cost between conventional 
diesel vehicles and diesel-electric hybrids (which would not be justified on 
commercial grounds by operators) and also buses powered by natural gas, and 
retrofitting of older vehicles to meet later ‘Euro’ standards. For example, the latest 
round of Low Emission Bus fund funded 479 buses, split between hydrogen, bio-gas, 
hybrid and fully electric technologies. In a previous round of the Clean Bus 
Technology Fund, grants were given to retrofit 439 buses to reduce nitrogen oxide 
emissions(Coach and Bus Week, 2016, p. 7).  
While some public spending is provided for infrastructure (such as busways) most of 
that for bus services is in the form of current spending. Stemming from the former 
fuel duty rebate, Bus Service Operators Grant (BSOG) is paid for local bus 
services within England. Originally set at a fixed rate per litre of fuel used on local 
service (80% of the total duty payable) this was restructured to provide incentives for 
low-carbon buses, smartcard technology and automatic vehicle location. The core 
grant remains related to fuel usage. Work by KPMG indicates a benefit-cost ratio of 
up to 3.7 (KPMG, 2017). Within England, all BSOG was originally paid direct to 
operators.  For services in London and tendered services elsewhere, it was diverted 
to TfL and the equivalent local authorities from the start of 2014 (DfT, 2013), while 
still being paid direct to operators for commercial services. Equivalent grants in 
Wales (Bus Services Support Grant) and Scotland operate on a slightly different 
basis, the latter being a flat rate per bus-km (which tends to favour rural services). 
Figure 12 shows that the proportion of income from users as such is generally 
around 60%, both in London and elsewhere.  
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Figure 12: Sources of income for bus operations in England 2015/16 (DfT table 
BUS0501a)5 
Major current spending trends in England are summarised below (drawn from DfT 
Table BUS 0502b). There has been a net decline of £65m and, within that a 
significant redistribution away from BSOG and support for additional services 
towards concessionary fares. 
• BSOG grew from £379m in 1999/2000 to a peak of £470m in 2009-10, then 
fell to £254m in 2015-16. 
• Concessionary fare compensation rose from £574m to £1049m between 
1999/2000 and 2015/16 (i.e. by 77%, but by 249% outside London and 
Metropolitan areas5 and the growth in provision and use was most marked).  
Free bus travel for over 60s throughout Wales, and Scotland was introduced 
in 2002, within authorities in England 2006, and throughout England since 
                                                           
5 In figure 12, Gross Support from Local Authorities is the total of all local authorities' gross costs 
incurred in support of bus services, either directly or by subsidies to operators or individuals.  The bulk 
of these costs will be accounted for by payments to operators providing tendered or supported bus 
services, but some other costs, for example administration costs, are also included. 
In figure 12 English Mets refers to the six Combined Authorities. These were the metropolitan areas of 
Tyne & Wear, Merseyside, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire 
up to 2014-15. From 2015-16, although Durham, Northumberland and Halton are part of the 
Combined Authorities, the gross public transport support and concessionary travel figures for 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have been adjusted to ensure consistency with 2014/15. 
Gross Support from 
Local Authorities 
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2008. Concessions for free travel for older travellers for free bus travel in 
London has been in place since the early 1970s. 
• Local net support payments grew from £313 million to £899 million (+187% / 
£586m), peaking at £1,224 million in 2008/09. This growth of £586 million was 
entirely due to substantial increases in London (from a base of £1 million). 
London peaked at £801 million in 2008/09, falling to £621 million in 2015/16. 
In summary, outside of London and Northern Ireland, there is only limited scope for 
local authorities to steer what they want to achieve through the bus network except 
through partnership with the private sector operators. In some places (e.g. Reading 
and Brighton) this has worked well and in others the relationship has been more 
fractious both between operators and between operators and local authorities. 
Compared with the position in most European cities, the inability to set fares, routes 
and frequencies is seen to be a weak governance position. 
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3.6. Freight 
This section covers the operation of freight on the transport infrastructure. A 
simplified map of actor by tier of governance is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Simplified Mapping of Key Actors by Governance Tier in Freight 
EU legislation forms the basis of a considerable amount of UK law relating to freight 
operations on the transport infrastructure. Because of the important need for 
interoperability across the UK, the UK Government embodies EU Directives into law, 
currently for the whole of the UK. Notable examples include lorry driver hours 
regulations and vehicle weights and specifications for freight vehicles engaged in 
cross-border operations.  
A number of key freight transport corridors within or partly within the UK are 
designated as part of the EU TEN-T strategic corridor network, and as such have 
had access to some EU funding for investment. Examples include the A55 North 
Wales corridor towards Ireland, the A14 corridor towards mainland Europe through 
east coast ports such as Harwich and Felixstowe and the Anglo-Scottish West Coast 
rail route. 
In the case of rail, both the Department for Transport and Network Rail have rail 
freight planning processes which consider capacity and investment issues for the 
network (DfT, 2016; Network Rail, 2017). The devolved administrations include 
freight in their national transport strategy documents. Highways England does not 
appear to have published a specific freight strategy document to date although it 
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refers to freight and the importance of its investments to long-distance freight as part 
of its business plan to 2020.  
Use of road infrastructure for freight operations is subject to considerable 
intervention at local authority level. Local authorities, as the highways authorities for 
their roads, act to impose various restrictions which impact primarily on commercial 
vehicles, including weight limits in individual streets or localities, restrictions on lorry 
movements at certain times of day and restrictions on parking, including short-term 
for collection and delivery. Conversely, local authorities may act to provide dedicated 
loading bays for freight vehicles. All such actions frequently form part of wider 
initiatives for environmental improvement or safety, such as pedestrianisation 
schemes. Strategy development forms part of the Local Transport Plan process in 
England and Wales and part of the Regional Transport Strategy process in Scotland. 
London is also required to consider freight policy. 
Regulation of the freight industry is undertaken by a combination of bodies. The 
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) was established in 2014, taking 
over various functions of the former Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA). 
DVSA covers Great Britain, with Northern Ireland having its own Driver and Vehicle 
Agency. DVSA has responsibility for ensuring that only safely operated and 
adequately maintained vehicles can legally use the road network. DVSA ensures 
that vehicles in use are consistent with the legislation on maximum vehicle weights 
and axle loadings, some of which is established at national rather than supranational 
level. Public weighbridges exist to support vehicle loading compliance; however, the 
majority of these are available under arrangement with the private companies that 
own them. 
DVSA also has responsibility for the enforcement of driving hours and vehicle 
tachograph compliance, the regulations for which are enshrined in EU legislation. It 
also has responsibility, along with the Health and Safety Executive and the police, for 
the safe carriage of dangerous goods by road with relevant UK legislation again 
enacting EU legislation. 
Responsibility in Great Britain for the system of commercial vehicle operator 
licensing rests with the Traffic Commissioners. Responsibilities cover not only the 
fitness of operators to operate, but also the approval of company operating centres. 
Northern Ireland has a separate system which is part of the Department for 
Infrastructure. 
In addition to pre-existing national taxation relating to road freight movement through 
fuel duties and vehicle excise duties, since 2014 the UK has operated an HGV Road 
User Levy system (DfT, 2018b). This is a levy designed to level the playing field 
inside the UK between UK and foreign road freight operators, while maintaining 
overall revenue neutrality for UK operators.  
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Freight vehicles crossing into the UK from Europe suffer from infiltration by illegal 
immigrants. The policing of this problem in the UK is the responsibility of the Border 
Force, which is part of the Home Office. Other enforcement problems relating to 
road freight operation include the use of untaxed fuel (‘red diesel’). Responsibility in 
this area rests with HMRC. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or ‘drones’ are increasingly considered as a future 
means of freight transport, including for ‘last mile’ home deliveries. Regulations 
controlling such activities in the face of any significant commercial exploitation are 
not yet in place, but current law relating to drone use is set out in the 2016 Air 
Navigation Order. Responsibility for control and regulation of drone activity lies with 
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
The freight industry is privately owned and operated including depots and 
warehousing. Grant funding for freight facilities is not currently available in England 
but it is available for small rail and maritime investments in Scotland and Wales. The 
relatively large size of lorries and the relatively high axle loadings on lorries means 
that heavily laden freight routes will have proportionately greater needs for funding 
for road maintenance, relative to total traffic flow. 
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3.7. Summary 
The institutional structures underpinning transport have, developed around modes 
and networks and around the industries of transport. The arrangements vary 
significantly between modes and, increasingly, across areas. There is a multitude of 
governance networks rather than a single overarching ‘governance of the transport 
system’. This makes it difficult to achieve integrated outcomes (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: Exemplar Differences in Rail and Maritime Structures 
Taking account of the summaries for each mode or network above and the more 
detailed information in the Technical Annex, Figure 15 shows qualitatively the 
relative influence of actors at different tiers of governance from global to local. Within 
this there are variations across the different administrations in the UK which are 
elaborated further in section 4. These are most significant in relation to bus, road and 
rail competencies and are reflected in Figure 16. Figure 17 shows the relative 
importance of the public sector compared with the private sector in terms of 
infrastructure and operations for the different modes and networks. 
 
Figure 15: Relative Influence of Different Scales of Government Across Modes 
(author’s elaboration) 
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Figure 16: Variation in Government Influence in Bus, Road and Rail across 
jurisdictions (authors’ elaboration) 
 
 
Figure 17: Private Sector vs. Public Sector Influence on Investment (authors’ 
elaboration) 
The aviation and maritime sectors are largely privately funded and operated but, 
because of their global connectivity, operate to a set of internationally consistent 
rules. The UK Government enacts these rules and ensures interoperability across 
jurisdictions, typically implementing EU-wide Directives. There is limited divergence 
in how these modes are governed within the UK. 
The rail sector in Great Britain has significant government influence through the 
funding and strategic direction given to the-now-public sector network manager 
Network Rail. While England dominates spending on rail overall, Scotland and Wales 
influence the investment plans and the most relevant franchise specifications for 
services. Regulation of the rail sector remains a reserved power with Westminster. 
Although the EU has significant influence over rail, the UK has often been ahead of 
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the curve on implementing provisions and only some aspects of interoperability 
apply. 
There is much greater divergence in arrangements for managing the road network. 
In Northern Ireland all national and local roads are managed by the Department for 
Infrastructure. In Scotland and Wales the national networks are managed by 
government departments or agencies and local roads by unitary authorities. In 
England the Strategic Road Network is managed by a government-owned company 
with some regulatory oversight. Local roads are managed by different tiers of local 
government. The registration and operation of vehicles (including buses and HGVs), 
driver safety and many aspects of road signage and use are managed by 
Westminster to ensure interoperability. 
While the importance of transport to achieving broader societal goals is clearly 
recognised in strategy documents, the arguments about spending across different 
areas and between modes can be influenced by logics and processes within the 
transport sector rather being driven by how best transport can serve those wider 
needs. Some of this disconnect is hard-wired into our institutional structures and 
governance processes through fixed regulatory processes.  
This section has introduced some of the variability between administrations and 
shown where greatest divergence exists. As well as divergence between 
administrations there is some divergence within administrations, particularly as a 
result of recent sub-national devolution in England. The next part of the report 
addresses these spatial differences and explores, through short case study 
vignettes, how and why these differences matter. 
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4. Governance and influence: What are 
the factors affecting influence within 
the UK transport system? 
 
A key theme of section 3 was the differences in structures for each of the 
transport modes and networks. There are also differences across and within the 
four countries of the United Kingdom. Governments have much greater influence on 
investments in road and rail infrastructure and on the support and regulation of the 
services that use those networks. Some of this is divided already into national or 
strategic assets and local assets. However, the divide is not this simple in practice. 
In part this is because national networks are important for functions which might be 
seen to be local in nature (e.g. rail commuting) and the division is artificial in practice, 
with goods vehicles using both strategic and local roads, and travellers likewise.  
This section begins, therefore, by exploring the differences across administrations 
and at a sub-national level within administrations. A key theme is to understand the 
flows of funding within the transport system and where decisions are taken. The 
arguments surrounding centralisation and devolution are often connected to the 
different views of local, sub-national and national governments about whether needs 
and priorities are properly recognised. This section draws on the Spatial section of 
the Technical Annex where further in-depth analysis can be found. 
The section then considers three case study examples as a means of understanding 
further how different decisions are taken. Section 4.2.4 then reviews the mode and 
network-based analysis of section 3, and the spatial differences described in this 
section, to consider which factors are important in influencing decisions in the UK 
transport system. 
4.1. Spatial differences 
Section 3 described the institutional arrangements for the main motorised modes of 
transport and the key networks and interchange infrastructure. While it looked at 
differences across administrations this was limited in its depth. This section therefore 
takes the UK-wide coverage provided previously and breaks it down into country and 
then sub-national levels, paying attention to how this differs across the devolved 
administrations. 
4.1.1. Devolved administrations 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that devolution in the UK is based 
on a formal division of powers between the Westminster Parliament and the 
devolved administrations achieved through legislation. The Scotland Act (1998) for 
example, which established the Scottish Parliament, therefore lists a range of 
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‘matters’ or powers that are ‘reserved’ to the UK government; that is those powers 
(such as over foreign affairs, the constitution and the macro-economy) that are 
critical to the overall maintenance of the UK as a single nation state. This means that 
the Scottish Parliament can legislate on any issue that is not explicitly listed as 
reserved.6 The number of powers initially reserved but subsequently devolved 
continues to be modified through, for example, The Scotland Act (2016) and The 
Wales Bill (2017) (see Sandford, 2015 and Bowers, 2016 respectively). 
• Roads policy is substantially devolved, with the important reservations being 
vehicle safety standards and road traffic law (although the 2016 Scotland Act 
devolved the power to set the blood alcohol limit to Scotland). 
• Railways policy is generally reserved (a common misperception is that it is 
devolved). Following amendments to the original devolution settlement in 
2001 and 2005, Scottish Ministers were granted powers to specify the 
franchise for passenger rail services beginning and ending in Scotland, and 
the funding of rail infrastructure respectively. Similar arrangements will apply 
to Wales for future franchises (Champion 2016b). Powers over the structure of 
the rail industry, safety and economic regulation remain reserved to 
Westminster. 
• Maritime policy is generally reserved, except for the powers to specify 
passenger services set out in section 3. 
• Aviation policy is generally reserved, although the Scottish and Welsh 
parliaments are able to influence certain aspects of policy (especially 
pertaining to airports themselves) via devolved planning powers. 
• Local transport is a devolved matter. The UK Government in Westminster 
therefore ‘develops the policy and provides the bulk of the funding for local 
transport in England, including: buses, walking, cycling and local transport 
(highways and rail) more generally; in other parts of the UK this is provided by 
the relevant devolved administration’ (Butcher, 2017, p. 3).  
Figure 18 shows the total spend on transport and spend per capita by country across 
the UK. England, by virtue of its relative size, population and network lengths spends 
almost ten times more than Scotland and 50 times more than Northern Ireland. 
However, per capita Scotland spends the most on transport, while Northern Ireland 
spends significantly less than other administrations. 
 
                                                           
6 This is the reason that Climate Change – an issue that might be assumed to be cross-UK in nature 
given its scale and interaction with international treaties – is in fact devolved, since the notion of Climate 
Change as a separate legal ‘matter’ had not emerged by 1998. 
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Figure 18: Total Spend on Transport and Spend/Capita by Country. Source: 
HMT Country and regional analysis: 2017 
Figure 19 shows the capital and current spend by country on rail and strategic roads 
since 2012/13. The graphs reconfirm the relative dominance of England in both 
capital and current spend, as may be expected due to the comparative population of 
each nation. This matters when considering how the rules for spending on rail are 
developed for example. While the three national appraisal guidance systems are 
similar, the detailed interpretation and programme decisions of Network Rail follow a 
single approach.  As the example in Section 4.2.2. shows, different priorities can 
exist in terms of programme scope and design between a national administration 
and Network Rail. Network Rail has to perform to its obligations within the regulatory 
framework of ORR and this framework is more strongly influenced by performance 
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across the English network where the majority of track and train services are which 
may make alignment more difficult. 
  
Figure 19: Capital (top) and current (bottom) spend on Rail (left) and Strategic 
Roads (right) by country. Source: HMT Country and regional analysis. 
An analysis of spend across the different administrations shows a combination of 
different preferences, different networks and also different constraints. Figure 20 
shows the spend across different areas of the Department for Transport.  This 
largely pertains to England but for some agencies this is UK-wide. Railways 
dominate spending with Highways England the next largest recipient of funds and as 
set out in section 3.3 this is set to rise substantially. The figure for Network Rail is 
larger than that for railways’ spend from DfT, because Network Rail has other 
sources of income, including subsidy and Crossrail. 
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Figure 20: Department for Transport Spending (data: Department for Transport 
Accounts 2016-17) 
Figure 21 shows the spend by category for Transport Scotland. Also evident in the 
funding breakdown of Transport Scotland is the highly significant share of 
expenditure devoted to rail. Notwithstanding the high cost base of rail in the UK per 
se (McNulty, 2011), this represents both the current large rail infrastructure projects 
such as the £750 million Edinburgh-Glasgow Improvements Programme funded by 
the Scottish Government, but also the high-quality specification of the ScotRail and 
Caledonian Sleeper passenger franchises. Also of interest is the c.£190 million 
annual expenditure on ferry services serving the western and northern islands. This 
level of expenditure on ferries is unique in the UK, and represents a highly significant 
funding constraint on the overall TS budget envelope for other initiatives. Equally, 
with Scotland accounting for 32% of the UK land mass but just 8% of the population 
(ONS, 2016; 2018), the trunk road network managed by Transport Scotland is much 
more rural in nature than that of Highways England. 
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Figure 21: Spend by category Transport Scotland (data: Transport Scotland 
Annual Report and Accounts 2016) 
Figure 22 shows the expenditure splits across all four countries as a percentage of 
transport expenditure.  
 
Figure 22: Spend by category by Country 2016/17. Source: HMT Country and 
regional analysis: 2017 
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The different national administrations have structured their approaches to managing 
transport in different ways, again reflecting scale but also devolution processes. In 
England Highways England is run as a government-owned company (see Section 
3.4). In the other three administrations, the Strategic Road Network is part of an 
integrated single government department or agency. At one end of the spectrum, the 
Department for Infrastructure in Northern Ireland oversees all services and 
infrastructure investments and local authorities have no transport role. Wales has the 
next simplest set of structures with national control over matters such as 
administering concessionary fares for buses. Scotland has broadly similar 
arrangements to Wales but, as discussed further in section 4.1.2, has a regional 
transport governance tier. England has multiple layers as well as the additional 
structures around Highways England. 
4.1.2. Sub-National Government 
There exists a very different set of local delivery structures across the UK as shown 
in Figure 23. It ranges from entirely centralised in Northern Ireland (so not reviewed 
further here) through to a potential six tiers in England. Scotland and Wales largely 
function with a two-tier system of national and local although regional bodies have 
some limited influence and this tends to be in a state of flux over time.  Spatial 
governance has been dynamic over time.  Remits have altered, and organisations 
have changed or come and gone.7 Key differences are summarised below thensome 
case studies are deployed to emphasise different approaches to decision-making. 
  
                                                           
7 Hence, it is only possible to be definitive about the number of tiers of governance when drilling down 
to a specific case study area. 
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Figure 23: Different tiers of government across the UK administrations 
(authors’ elaboration) 
The National Audit Office in its 2012 review of funding of local transport in England 
summarised the overarching role of local government in planning transport services, 
stating that:  
‘They have around 300 statutory responsibilities for transport, such as developing 
local transport plans and administering the ‘national concessionary travel scheme’. 
[Local authorities] plan and commission services (including bus and light rail), and 
provide and maintain infrastructure (collectively they are responsible for 98 per cent 
of the road network). Local authorities encourage public use by providing information 
and services for groups such as the elderly and disabled.’ (NAO, 2012, p5)  
Local transport planning in England is delivered through a variety of structures. In 
total there are five possible types of local authority in England. These are: 
• ‘County councils – cover the whole county and provide 80 per cent of services 
in these areas, including [transport], children’s services and adult social care 
• District councils – cover a smaller area within a county, providing more local 
services (such as housing, local planning, waste and leisure but not children’s 
services or adult social care); can be called district, borough or city council. 
• Unitary authorities – just one level of local government responsible for all local 
services, can be called a council (e.g. Medway Council), a city council (e.g. 
Nottingham City Council) or borough council (e.g. Reading Borough Council) 
• London boroughs – each of the 32 boroughs is a unitary authority. 
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• Metropolitan districts – effectively unitary authorities, the name being a relic 
from past organisational arrangements. They can be called metropolitan 
borough or city councils.’ (LGIU, 2017, [brackets added]) 
In addition to these bodies there is the Greater London Authority which sets out the 
Mayor of London’s transport strategy. Transport for London acts as the delivery 
agency for much of the mayor’s transport strategy and works with the London 
boroughs for more local matters. Elsewhere in England there are nine combined 
authorities, many but not all of which are based around previous Passenger 
Transport Authority areas. According to LGIU, 2017: 
‘These combined authorities receive additional powers and funding from central 
government. They are important for transport and economic policy across the 
regions in which they are based and in many cases for planning and delivery of 
services in conjunction with the associated Metropolitan Districts and other partners.’  
There are currently nine combined authorities in England, seven of which have a 
directly elected mayor, with Sheffield due to elect a Mayor in May 2018. The history 
of these organisations derives from the Metropolitan Counties which were abolished 
in 1986. The county boundaries were broadly defined by the travel to work areas of 
the major cities. This logic has been reinforced with the Combined Authorities 
integrating economic and transport planning functions.8 Further information on 
Combined Authorities is available in the Technical Annex sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
Transport for the North (TfN) was created in October 2014 and is a partnership of 
local transport authorities, the Department for Transport, and business leaders. Its 
membership includes 19 local authorities and 11 LEPs in the North and it works with 
national agency representatives from Highways England, Network Rail and HS2 
Limited to develop plans and identify priorities for strategic transport infrastructure 
over the North of England. Draft regulations were laid before Parliament in 
November 2017 and TfN was granted statutory status as a sub-national transport 
organisation from 1 April 2018 (DfT, 2017c, TfN, 2018). Other sub-national bodies 
are also developing such as Midlands Connect, England’s Economic Heartland and 
Transport for the South East. 
  
                                                           
8 Travel to work boundaries are not easy to define and change over time and can be hard to map to 
local municipal boundaries. Barnsley for example connects to both the South and West Yorkshire 
labour markets. The Île-de-France area has integrated transport planning and over a much broader 
spatial area than the Greater London Authority and TfL, in part because of the scale of the regional 
boundaries in France. 
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Table 4 sets out, in general terms the division of responsibilities for local transport 
between national government and local government in England. As noted, however, 
local transport planning in England is becoming an increasingly heterogeneous set of 
arrangements. In London, for example, Transport for London is responsible for a 
core road network which is not generally the case for Combined Authorities in other 
cities. More information on these differences across areas is available in the 
Technical Annex. Arrangements are also distinct in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. These differences are discussed below with further detail given in the 
Technical Annex and in Annex A of this report. 
Scotland has the most complete set of powers over transport devolved to it from 
Westminster. Through the Scotland Act (1998), the Scotland Act (2012) and 
Scotland Act (2015), most powers related to local transport have been devolved. 
These include, ‘Roads and road-based transport: promotion of road safety; bus 
policy – including bus subsidies and regulation; cycling powers; parking policy; local 
road pricing (including congestion charging); speed limits; road signs; management 
of pedestrian crossings; and concessionary travel schemes’ (Butcher, 2017). 
In Scotland, three tiers of government matter to transport delivery: national (where 
Transport Scotland is the strategy and delivery organisation for the Scottish 
Government), regional and local. At a national level Transport Scotland is 
responsible for a range of policy areas which have direct influence over regional and 
local transport, as well as funding allocations and the approval of major scheme 
funding. Transport Scotland sets a policy context through a National Transport 
Strategy, it manages the national concessionary fares scheme for elderly and 
disabled people, liaises with regional transport partnerships, including monitoring of 
funding, and leads on sustainable transport, road safety and accessibility, local 
roads, bus, freight and taxi policy (Rehfisch, 2016). 
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Table 4: Roles and Responsibilities for Local Transport in England (NAO, 2012) 
Service Department for Transport Local authorities 
Road 
network 
• Sets policy framework and 
provides guidance 
• Responsible for the Strategic 
Road Network (via Highways 
England) 
• Provides funding and 
guidance to local transport 
authorities for local roads 
• Manage, maintain and 
enhance local highway 
network (including traffic 
signals and signs) 
Bus services • Sets policy framework to 
determine how bus services 
are managed 
• Pays a grant to all private 
operators 
• Advises Department of 
Communities and Local 
Government on the formula 
for the concessionary fare 
payments scheme for local 
authorities 
• Contract with bus companies 
to provide commercially 
unprofitable services 
• Reimburse bus operators for 
concessionary fares 
• Run some community bus 
services 
• Maintain and enhance bus 
stops, stations and signs 
Rail services 
(incl. light 
rail) 
• Sets policy framework to 
determine how rail services 
are managed and sets high- 
level rail outputs 
• Provides funds for enhancing, 
maintaining and operating 
national rail network 
• Specifies and manages 
franchises with train 
operating companies 
• Are consulted when new rail 
services are contracted. 
• May buy extra services or 
infrastructure improvements 
from operators or Network 
Rail 
• London, Merseyside and Tyne 
and Wear specify and manage 
rail services within their area 
paid for by a grant from DfT 
• Some local authorities build 
and run light rail or community 
rail schemes 
Other 
transport 
services and 
infrastructure 
• Allocates funding for major 
schemes, services or 
funding competitions 
• Sets the policy framework for 
walking and cycling 
• Deliver transport projects, 
usually through third party 
contractors 
• Infrastructure for pedestrians 
and cyclists 
• Parking services 
• Licensing private hire vehicles 
and taxis 
 
Transport Scotland sets out the purpose of Regional Transport Partnerships (RTPs) 
as being ‘to strengthen the planning and delivery of regional transport developments’ 
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(Transport Scotland, 2017a). Each RTP has to prepare a Regional Transport 
Strategy and set out when and how cross-boundary projects and proposals would be 
delivered. It is also important to note that the Strathclyde Partnership for Transport 
(formerly Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive) owns and operates the 
Glasgow subway and major bus stations across the west of Scotland. Transport 
Scotland establishes the administrative form of RTPs as: 
‘independent bodies corporate defined in the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005. That 
legislation bases them on the local government model but they are not local 
authorities and they are not NDPBs. RTPs are like joint boards, bringing councils 
together to perform local government functions collectively and strategically over a 
larger area’ (Transport Scotland, 2017a). 
With a focus on coordination, the RTPs are rather weak bodies in practice 
(Pangbourne, 2010). They rely on councils voluntarily sharing their transport powers, 
and although the potential exists in the legislation for an agreement to coordinate the 
roads function regionally, this has not taken place anywhere. Thus the role of the 
RTPs has largely been limited to producing a regional transport plan that seeks to 
guide the actions of other actors. 
Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (SPT) is rather different as it was formerly a 
Passenger Transport Authority and Executive created under the same UK-wide 
legislation as its equivalents in England. SPT lost its powers to specify local rail 
services to Transport Scotland when the national agency was set up, which 
represented a major diminution in its powers. However, it still operates the Glasgow 
Subway, seven bus stations, and some local ferries. 
There are 32 unitary local authorities in Scotland. Local authorities are the 
designated highways authorities for non-trunk roads. Scotland does not have Local 
Transport Plans but rather Local Transport Strategies, which have always been non-
mandatory, non-statutory documents, but have been important where a local 
authority is planning to introduce a significant new intervention such as congestion 
planning. There are no powers available for Scottish local authorities to bring forward 
workplace parking levies, although there is a live debate between them and the 
Scottish Government about whether they should be granted the power to levy these 
and other ‘ad hoc’ or discretionary taxes in a range of sectors. Local authority areas 
reflect the geographical diversity within Scotland with wide variations in size (from 
60km2 in Dundee City council area to 25,656km2 in Highland council area) and 
population (from under 20,000 people in Orkney Islands council area to over 600,000 
in Glasgow City council area). 
The Welsh Government is ‘responsible for developing and delivering a transport 
strategy and a National Transport Plan’ (Butcher, 2017, p.14). The last national 
transport strategy was published in 2008, although a more recent Finance Plan was 
produced in 2015. Local transport planning powers and arrangements have seen 
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substantial changes and continue to experience do so. This is due in part to the 
changing devolution relationship between Westminster and Cardiff and in part to 
changing emphasis given to transport planning through regional or local bodies. 
The Wales Act (2017) will, broadly speaking, mirror the devolution agreement 
arrangements in place in Scotland so that all matters which are not specifically 
reserved for decision-making at a UK level will be devolved to Wales. This contrasts 
with the position at the moment where only those matters which have specifically 
been listed could be legislated upon. In effect, the key areas of local transport 
competence which will become devolved once the provisions of the Wales Act 
(2017) are put in place are: 
• setting speed limits; 
• regulating with regards to pedestrian crossings and traffic signs; 
• prescribing signs and approving school crossing patrol uniforms; 
• complete powers over the bus network including to legislate on re-regulation; 
and 
• taxi and private hire vehicle (PHV) licensing. 
Local government in Wales comprises 22 single-tier unitary authorities. ‘The 
Transport Act 2000, as amended by the Transport (Wales) Act 2006, introduced a 
statutory requirement for local transport authorities to produce a Local Transport 
Plan (LTP) every five years and to keep it under review’ (Welsh Government, 2014, 
p. 3). This is similar to the requirement for strategy development in England. It is up 
to local authorities whether to work alone or to submit joint plans with neighbouring 
local authorities. In total nine local transport plans were submitted in 2015 from the 
22 single-tier authorities. It is important to note that in 2006, the Regional Transport 
Planning Order (2006) required that local authorities be part of one of four Regional 
Transport Planning consortia covering South East Wales, South West Wales, Mid 
Wales or North Wales and that this should be the basis for transport planning (NafW, 
2006 and Figure 24). However, these consortia were abolished in April 2014.  
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Figure 24: The now defunct Regional Transport Consortia of Wales (Source, 
NafW, 2008, p56) 
The establishment of the Cardiff Capital City Region Deal has, however re-ignited a 
bottom-up discussion on integrated transport planning at a regional scale. In January 
2017 the City of Cardiff confirmed plans for a non-statutory ‘Capital Region Transport 
Authority’ which would be responsible for: 
• ‘Pooled local transport resources; 
• Regional planning for the local transport network; 
• Working with Transport for Wales to ensure objectives for transport 
investment are aligned; 
• Exploring the creation of a single integrated ticketing platform for public 
transport across the Cardiff Capital Region; 
• Working in partnership with the Welsh Government to define the priorities of 
the South East Wales Metro concept and to support its delivery;…’(CoCC, 
2017, p. 7) 
Over time, therefore, there has been considerable variation not only in opinions on 
regional-level planning, but also in who has formal responsibility for transport 
planning at a local versus regional scale. The reality is that with nine local transport 
plans and one bottom-up regional body, there is a pooling of resources across 
authorities to help deliver cross-boundary projects and also in recognition of the 
scale of tasks and the need to share skills and resources effectively across 
boundaries. 
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The approach to funding suggests a very strong national-level influence over what 
happens year to year in each authority or plan area. The Welsh Government 
publishes a set of approved schemes which, for 2017–18 ranged from £4,000 for the 
production of active travel maps through to £1.5 million for highway works on Cynon 
Gateway South (Welsh Government, 2017). 
It is important to note here that walking and cycling planning and investment 
takes place at the local level.9 It is not possible to be explicit about volumes of 
funding channelled to these modes as, aside from challenge funds, the expenditure 
is part of the integrated transport allocations given to local government.  It is 
therefore difficult to separate out the spending on each mode when, for example a 
road or junction is upgraded. A noteworthy legislative difference between Wales and 
other administrations is the Active Travel (Wales) Act 2013. This requires local 
authorities to develop integrated network maps for active travel (walking and cycling) 
and to consider these when developing their local transport plans. The maps were 
due to be produced in Autumn 2017 and so it remains early in the process to say 
how this is affecting practice on the ground (see Technical Annex 2.5.3.5 for further 
details). The Scottish Government has a Cycling Action Plan and the Department for 
Transport has a Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy for England (Transport 
Scotland, 2017b; Department for Transport, 2017e). While provision is delivered 
locally, there are increasing efforts to steer and incentivise local governments to do 
more to support active travel given the clearly recognised public health benefits as 
well as the traditional congestion reduction goals.  
  
                                                           
9 Sustrans maintains and develops a national cycling network.  It receives some grant funding from 
government and works with local authorities. 
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4.1.3. Summary discussion 
There is significant diversity in institutional arrangements across the UK, particularly 
between local and national tiers of government. This in part reflects the different 
sizes of the networks and populations governed. In Northern Ireland all transport is 
conducted by a national department. In Scotland and Wales the two primary tiers are 
local and national - although regional decision-making continues to play a role, 
formally in Scotland. In England there are six different spatial tiers. There has been a 
trend towards layering of institutions over time with some of the change coming from 
outside of transport, for example with Local Enterprise Partnerships and City 
Devolution and growth deals. This sometimes results in misaligned boundaries 
although it has brought together employment, skills and transport in some places. 
The reform of sub-national governance, particularly in England, generally added 
layers to decision-making processes. (Ward, 2017).  
Regulatory power and budgetary responsibility, remain with national or local 
government for the most part. This relates strongly to democratic accountability for 
resource spend as well as some long-standing institutional path dependency 
(change is slow). However, here there has been some significant change over the 
past 20 years with devolution to Scotland, Wales and more recently Northern Ireland 
moving many tasks to newly formed national government structures. The 
establishment of the Greater London Authority and Transport for London has also 
been seen as successful. The shifts to Mayoral Combined Authorities alongside City 
Deals is a further move in this direction. 
There remains a strong logic for common regulatory oversight of transport 
system operations where: 
1. The flows are predominantly international and the UK contributes to rather 
than makes the rules. 
  
2. The flows within the UK are significant across borders and where there is a 
need for interoperable systems within the UK (e.g. vehicle standards, train 
operating rules, payment mechanisms, electric vehicle charging standards). 
There is greater divergence in defining what the policy priorities are for different 
areas and, therefore, what the balance of infrastructure spend across modes is, and 
the balance between carrots and sticks in terms of demand management. Here, the 
logic as to who should lead and who should influence is often less clear. Some 
examples which demonstrate this are: 
• An infrastructure investment scheme that crosses multiple boundaries and 
serves, local, regional and national needs. Northern Powerhouse Rail, for 
example, could affect local authorities from Newcastle to Liverpool. It matters 
to those areas that the line passes through whether the services will stop and 
how often, and it also matters to those areas not being served which may, in 
Governance of UK Transport Infrastructures 
62 
 
relative terms, lose out. Such a scheme is of national importance in England 
as part of economic rebalancing but it is also of pan-regional importance (the 
combined interests of the North West, Yorkshire and the North East), of sub-
regional importance (e.g. Combined Authorities and LEPs) and important to 
the local authorities that form part of these or surrounding areas. The scale of 
the investment suggests the scheme needs national input, but there is a need 
to ensure that the scheme is shaped by local priorities and that any local 
contributions to funding can be coordinated (see also section 4.2.1). 
 
• The introduction of a local congestion charging scheme. The costs of 
implementing the London Congestion Charging Scheme were a very high 
proportion of total income in the initial stages of adoption (initially 76% falling 
to 35%: Börjession and Kristoffersson, 2017). The planning for the scheme 
was entirely run out of Transport for London. By contrast, in Sweden, the 
Stockholm congestion charge (introduced in 2006) was undertaken with an 
eye to national standardisation. When Gothenburg introduced charging in 
2013 the same system was used with a common back office procedure for 
charging established and some additional bridges with tolls also brought 
under this system. Decisions to adopt a charge and how to design the charge 
are local matters but there are benefits to be had from coordination of a 
common technology for identification and system for payment. Gothenburg 
may have been too small to have afforded its own full charging infrastructure 
(Börjession and Kristoffersson, 2017). 
There are also policies and investments with diverging priorities which do not have 
such significant cross-boundary elements. These might be deliberate statements of 
policy divergence (e.g. different approaches to concessionary fares between 
Scotland and England and on drink drive limits) or they may simply be cases where 
convergence either does not make sense or is difficult or impractical to achieve even 
if it was desirable. For example, while good practice is shared on local road 
maintenance this is not harmonised and decisions on where to provide bus lanes are 
locally determined. 
Wherever the institutional boundaries are established, there is a need to think about 
how adjacent levels of government might be involved in implementing policies 
effectively. This is how governance should be interpreted: it is the steering of multiple 
actors through a network. While there is a well-established set of studies suggesting 
that the role of governmental actors has diminished over time, there is also evidence 
that resources and power to act are still crucial to the development of networks and 
their governance e.g. Rhodes, (2007) or Docherty and Shaw (2008). It seems most 
important to think, therefore, about where resources and power to act lie for different 
types of decision. This is reviewed further through discussion of case studies in 
section 4.2. 
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4.2. Case studies 
4.2.1. Transport for the North 
Transport for the North (TfN) was created in October 2014 and is a partnership of 
local transport authorities, the Department for Transport, and business leaders. Its 
membership includes 19 local authorities and 11 LEPs in the North and it works with 
national agency representatives from Highways England, Network Rail, and HS2 
Limited to develop plans and identify priorities for strategic transport infrastructure 
over the North of England.  
The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 provides for the creation of 
Sub-National Transport Bodies (STB) and enables the functions of STB’s to be 
derived from a number of sources including: 
• The power to prepare a transport strategy and the power to advise, co-
ordinate, and make proposals from the Local Transport Act 2008; 
• Other public authority functions to be exercisable instead of, by, or jointly (but 
not concurrently) with public authorities; and 
• Local transport functions (i.e. of CAs, LTAs, or PTEs) to be exercisable 
instead, of, by, or jointly (but not concurrently) with local authorities. (West 
Yorkshire Combined Authority, 2016). 
Draft regulations were laid before Parliament in November 2017 and TfN was 
granted statutory status as a sub-national transport organisation from 1 April 2018 
(DfT, 2017; TfN, 2018). The regulations set out the functions of TfN in relation to 
transport strategy and delivery in the North of England. The key functions of TfN are: 
• to develop a Transport Strategy for the North; 
• to advise the Secretary of State on transport in the North; 
• to co-ordinate regional transport programmes such as smart ticketing; and 
• to co-manage the rail franchises in the North and the planned major road 
network. 
A draft Strategic Transport Plan (STP) for the North of England was prepared with 
the aim of facilitating a transformation of inter-urban connections between centres of 
population and accelerating economic growth (Transport for the North, 2017a). It 
sets out proposals for a multi-modal programme of prioritised interventions 
comprising all transport modes reflecting the TfN’s preferred options for achieving its 
aims within realistic budget parameters and was published for public consultation in 
January 2018 (Transport for the North, 2017a; Transport for the North, 2017b).  
Informed by the consultation outcomes, the final STP will become the adopted plan 
and main policy document for TfN later in 2018. It will be used to inform Government 
and its agencies of the priorities for investment in strategic transport connections. 
Transport for the North was also tasked with assessing the case for some specific 
transport interventions including the proposals for Northern Powerhouse Rail 
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(Transport for the North, 2017c) and three strategic road projects: The Trans-
Pennine Tunnel, M60 North West Quadrant, and North Trans-Pennine links via the 
A66 and A69 (Transport for the North, 2017d).  It was also allocated £150 million of 
funding to develop plans and implement a project for integrated smart travel in the 
North (DfT, 2017c). In addition, Rail North will transfer to TfN when it becomes a 
statutory body in April 2018, ensuring that TfN can take a co-ordinated view of ‘track 
and services’ strategic planning and investment case development.  TfN is also 
working on Strategic Development corridors, to help prioritise long term investment 
programmes and increase economic growth. 
While TfN supports local and national government to align local investment in public 
transport and national infrastructure to form a coherent investment programme, TfN 
is not intended to replace or replicate the work of existing local transport bodies 
(Transport for the North, 2017e). It does however reflect the reality of increasingly 
interconnected labour markets spanning across what used to be more distinct travel 
to work areas. 
TfN’s Partnership Board provides direction, scrutiny and oversight on the TfN’s 
strategy, performance and capability.  It ensures that all partners in TfN have a say 
in decision-making.  The Partnership Board also has a statutory role as an advisory 
body to TfN. It comprises of representatives from local government and LEPs, along 
with the Secretary of State for Transport and representatives from Highways 
England, Network Rail and HS2 Ltd. The Board has an independent Chair – John 
Cridland CBE, former Director-General of the CBI (Transport for the North, 2017f). 
Each local government representative receives a vote weighted to reflect the 
population of their constituent authority. To approve a Budget, approve the 
Constitution, or adopt a Transport Strategy will require an increased majority of 75% 
of the weighted votes and a simple majority of Members of TfN (Transport for the 
North, 2017h). 
The Partnership Board is supported by the Executive Board which is the main body 
for managing and delivering the TfN’s programme of work; it also provides decisions 
for approval to the Partnership Board. Its members include senior representation 
from each local transport authority partner, the Department for Transport, each 
national transport body, and the independent Chair (Transport for the North, 2017a). 
TfN’s funding is provided by the Department for Transport although its current 
funding comes from a number of different sources (Transport for the North, 2017g): 
• Core funding – £50 million of non-ring-fenced funding over five years.  
• Transport Development Fund (Northern Powerhouse Rail) - 
Approximately £60 million of ring-fenced funding to be spent only on Northern 
Powerhouse Rail Activity.  
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• Transport Development Fund (Roads) - Approximately £75 million for three 
Strategic Road Studies in the North which has been principally managed by 
the Department for Transport and Highways England.  
• Smart funding – Funding for integrated and smart travel dependent on 
approvals through normal business case processes (£150 million).  
The Constituent Authorities may also be required to contribute to the costs of TfN but 
the decision as to the amount of such contributions would require unanimous 
agreement and written consent from the Constituent Authorities (Transport for the 
North, 2017h).  
If, in the future, further responsibilities were to be devolved to TfN (for example to set 
the strategic pan-Northern transport objectives for Highways England and Network 
Rail or to take responsibility for specifying franchised rail services), TfN would 
require powers currently exercised by central government to be devolved. These 
might include: 
• powers to set the objectives and priorities for the Rail Investments 
Programme; 
• powers to determine the franchise rail service specification; and 
• powers to set and vary the objectives of the Road Investments Programme. 
(West Yorkshire Combined Authority, 2016). 
The establishment of Transport for the North provides the basis of a single voice for 
the North on strategic transport matters, and the prioritisation of pan-Northern 
projects. Having governance and leadership drawn from both the public and private 
sectors, and with national and regional organisations as members, enables a 
comprehensive view of strategic transport investment, and how it supports wider 
policy objectives particularly for the economy. The scale of the organisation should 
facilitate more capability across a larger functional economic geography to deliver 
growth for the North, which would be difficult for single authorities to achieve. The 
body has been established to recognise the need to govern through a complex 
network and to try and provide a focal point for those discussions to take place. 
TfN’s focus is on strategic transport and pan-Northern measures to improve intra-
urban connectivity. Some critics argue that the TfN should also seek to help improve 
local transport across the North by supporting local authorities in implementing their 
local plans. The argument is that the TfN will be seen as irrelevant to many 
communities if it does not also focus on local transport across the north. It should be 
noted that the development of smart ticketing is seen to be a step in the right 
direction. 
As TfN represents a large area of England and is made up of a partnership of 
multiple groups, it may be expected to experience reaching a consensus when 
making decisions. For example, when deciding on where to focus investment it is 
likely that there will be multiple competing opinions. Meeting them all would risk 
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spreading investment too thinly, while prioritising certain projects over others would 
lead to difficulties during the decision-making process. Furthermore, this may make it 
harder to generate benefits that are only possible through a “joined-up” package of 
schemes and to meeting the need to prioritise to ensure value for money.  
Large area multi-modal transport investment planning is not new in England. In the 
early 2000s a series of multi-modal transport studies were commissioned by the, 
then, Department for Transport Local Government and the Regions. These ultimately 
became unstitched when the delivery agencies (Network Rail, Highways England 
and the local authorities) all conducted their own prioritisation exercises and could 
not afford the expenditure on the proposals that the studies recommended (Shaw et 
al., 2006). The current approach seeks to overcome some of these difficulties by 
ensuring that the delivery agencies are integrated and the funding envelope is clear. 
However, the process still creates a further advisory voice in the decision-making 
process. 
4.2.2. Edinburgh-Glasgow Rail Improvement 
Scotland’s National Transport Strategy was published in 2006, and refreshed in early 
2016 (Transport Scotland, 2016). The original iteration of the strategy was heavily 
focused on economic growth, and was focused on three ‘Key Strategic Outcomes’:  
• improved journey times and connections, to tackle congestion and lack of 
integration and connections in transport;  
• reduced emissions, to tackle climate change, air quality, health improvement; 
and  
• improved quality, accessibility and affordability, to give choice of public 
transport, better quality services and value for money, or alternative to car. 
The first Strategic Transport Projects Review (STPR), a 20-year programme of 
infrastructure investment projects managed by the Scottish Government in support of 
the NTS’s objectives, was published in 2012, and is due to run until 2032. However, 
once the current ‘refresh’ of the NTS is completed, the STPR will also undergo a 
mid-period review to ensure its planned programme of interventions remains 
appropriate. This is clearly a much longer planning horizon than either the rail 
Control Periods or Road Periods in England.  This brings the potential benefit of a 
longer horizon to manage the investment pipeline and the supply chain required to 
deliver it, but also runs the risk of being more difficult to flex as the context for 
transport interventions changes. 
The Edinburgh-Glasgow Improvement Programme (EGIP) is a set of rail network 
improvements including electrification and the rebuilding of major stations with a total 
capital cost of around £750 million. EGIP was one of the two national priorities 
identified by Transport Scotland in the original Strategic Transport Projects Review, 
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and is funded by the Scottish budget. This therefore differs from the arrangements 
for Transport for the North where strategy and resourcing are separated. 
Responsibility for the actual design of EGIP rested with Network Rail as any major 
rail intervention would do. The early years of the project preparation stage were 
marked by friction between National Rail and Transport Scotland over the design 
and scope of the project. With no obvious mediation mechanism to resolve 
conflicting views, much time and resource was spent, with decisions bouncing back 
and forward between the two organisations until a final scope was agreed.  
Delivery of some aspects of EGIP, most importantly the core electrification of the 
main line, has run significantly late and over budget (Office of Rail and Road, 2016). 
The Scottish Government has no option but to direct additional resources to Network 
Rail if the project is to be completed. Further, the late delivery of the project has 
ramifications for the revenue profile of the ScotRail franchise and therefore public 
sector support of the railway in the round. At the same time, the choice to use the 
franchisee to procure the new rolling stock for the route adds an additional interface 
to project delivery. 
4.2.3. Liverpool2  
The Port of Liverpool is owned by Peel Ports Group, which in turn is owned 50.1 % 
by the Peel Group and 49.9 % by Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management – formerly 
Reef Infrastructure. The £400 million Liverpool2 container terminal project involved 
construction of a new 854m deep-water quay able to accommodate two 380m long 
13,500TEU ships. Construction started in 2013, although licences from MMO for 
dredging of over 5 million cubic metres from the seabed, much of it used for 
reclamation and creation of terminal land, allowed a start to the work in 2012. The 
terminal opened in November 2016. Three licences were needed from MMO to 
perform construction activities. In addition, planning activities for the project were 
carried out in conjunction with the Environment Agency and Natural England, to 
meet the environmental requirements. Plans for the terminal were initially given 
consent via a Harbour Revision Order issued by DfT in 2007 (Container 
Management 2007).  
Sefton Council helped create and lead a Port Masterplan Group (PMG) early in the 
project’s development (Sefton Council 2012). The PMG was tasked with assessing 
likely environmental and traffic impacts, to undertake community engagement, and 
engage with key stakeholders such as the Highways Agency, Sefton MBC, Peel 
Ports, and Mersey Maritime. The Port Master Plan was viewed positively within the 
Liverpool City Region Deal (Liverpool City Region, Local Enterprise Partnership, 
2018).  The project falls under Annex I of the EIA Directive 85/337/EEC as amended 
by Directives 97/11/EC and 2003/35/EC. A full EIA was undertaken for the project, 
including environmental impact studies (EIS) and a public inquiry. Principal 
contractor appointed by Peel for construction of the project is Lend Lease. Project 
cost was £400 million with £150 million of this financed through a long-term loan 
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from the EIB (European Investment Bank). The bank financed the project due to its 
‘capability as a category A TEN-T (i.e. core) port to support maritime and inland 
transport as an alternative to other modes and thus contribute to transport 
sustainability’.  
The project was also dependent on a £35 million UK Government grant to dredge 
the Mersey to accommodate larger ships (BBC News, 2012). This grant was applied 
for by Sefton Borough Council from the Regional Growth Fund albeit with the money 
subsequently going to Peel to cover dredging expense (Osborne, 2012). The choice 
of applicant was considered by competing ports to be ‘a device’ to circumvent the 
issues of state aid which would apply if Peel Ports had been the applicant. The 
European Commission subsequently decided that the aid for dredging was for public 
works in the general interest and did not therefore constitute state aid (European 
Commission, 2014a); this reflects common practice elsewhere in the EU where 
public bodies maintain navigation channels.  
The proposed Highways England scheme to upgrade the A5036 aims to reduce 
congestion on the main road serving the port. Although the project will have 
significant environmental impacts, the appraisal for the port project revealed 
economic and social benefits to Merseyside and the broader North-West region, 
noting that it would add  £5 billion gross value to the local economy and 5,000 direct 
and indirect jobs of which 400 will be at the Port of Liverpool (Bam Nuttall, 2017). 
Peel Ports is a member of the government’s Northern Powerhouse Partnership 
Programme, which aims to champion the North’s strengths, as well as promote local 
developments across transport, skills and innovation, culture and devolution. 
Environmental factors represented key issues within the regulatory landscape, 
followed by financial challenges. Support of the local council was crucial for the 
project, as was the high-level political support at UK level. This in turn helped create 
support for grant aid deemed essential for the project to proceed. EU designations 
(core port status) assisted in terms of the EIB loan facility, the latter allocated on 
preferable public-sector terms (i.e. longer repayment term than a commercial loan).  
The case reflects how different institutional actors discharge their responsibilities in 
the context of a major maritime infrastructure development.  It also shows the 
funding challenges faced, including the possibility (and need) for ports to access 
public funding - something the prevailing UK policy approach towards ports does not 
always fully recognise. The business case for the development of the port did not, 
however, have to go through a standard project appraisal, although the connecting 
road infrastructure did. The future role of the EIB as a financer of investments such 
as this may need to be re-evaluated following Brexit depending on whether UK 
infrastructure remains part of the Trans-European Transport Networks. 
4.2.4. Discussion of factors 
The three cases allow a comparison of different aspects of the decision-making 
process: 
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• Project Specification and Funding. In the case of the Edinburgh-Glasgow 
Improvement Programme (EGIP) and Liverpool2 there was a clear ‘client’ for 
the work and specification of need. In the case of EGIP the scheme entered 
the Transport Scotland infrastructure pipeline and then formed part of Network 
Rail’s delivery programme. Funding was obtained through the Transport 
Scotland block grant for the most part. For Liverpool2, the driving force was 
the private sector owners of the port facility. However, there was clearly a 
need to build a consensus at Liverpool City Region level and National 
Government about the need for the expansion. In the case of Transport for 
the North, the aim has been to try and ensure that there is a clear 
specification of need, which prior to the establishment of TfN had proven 
difficult to achieve with so many potential voices influencing the debate. 
• Project delivery. In the case of Liverpool2, the majority of the works were 
conducted and co-ordinated by the port itself, including the dredging work for 
which government grant funding from the EU had been obtained. The 
specifier and the funder were the same organisation. By contrast Transport 
Scotland relies on Network Rail for effective delivery of the EGIP project and 
is required to fund overruns.  
• Network of Actors. While ports are predominantly private sector concerns it 
is only through working in partnership with the local authority that expansion 
schemes become feasible. In the case of Liverpool2, planning permission, 
sourcing funding for dredging and interfacing with Highways England were all 
necessary to ensure the investment took place. So, while the private sector is 
key to instigating projects in ports, the public sector is an important delivery 
partner. The success of Liverpool2 can be contrasted with a failed freight 
terminal proposal in Radlett where the development was challenged by the 
local authority (see section 1.3.5 of the Technical Annex). The network for the 
EGIP case is coordinated by Transport Scotland and is far simpler than that 
developed around Transport for the North. The delivery environment, though, 
relies almost exclusively on Network Rail so, once the decision has been 
taken and the investment is programmed this appears easier than with 
Liverpool2. 
As noted earlier in this section, generalising about factors that influence delivery can 
be a little shallow when there are so many differences between areas. However, the 
common factors which seem to be important in seeing infrastructure projects 
advance are: 
• Identification of a clear need 
• Developed consensus across key actors 
• A clear funding channel. 
This would seem consistent with analysis which suggests that Transport for London 
is an example of an effective urban transport authority as it has these elements 
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largely within its control, with the exception of mega-projects such as Crossrail. The 
analysis of Scotland in section 2.1 of the Technical Annex makes a similar point. 
Transport Scotland has established an effective process to identify need across 
modes and areas, and it is clear that this is the principal agency around which 
project ideas will be developed and delivered. It has a clear budget and therefore a 
certain pipeline of investment. In both of these cases, the ‘culture’ of governance in 
each location is an important additional factor: in both London and Scotland, there is 
both more potential and political desire for vertical alignment of transport strategies 
‘centrally’. Similar cultural differences can also be seen in those European examples 
that are often held up as good practice in effective transport governance see, for 
example, Paulsson et al. 2016. 
It was also suggested in our work on the future of funding that a stable funding 
environment and long-term investment pipeline was important for effective delivery 
(IPA, 2016). This can be both in ensuring a stable construction sector and building 
the right skills and capacity to design and deliver schemes within organisations (see 
also HMT and Infrastructure UK, 2010). This is discussed further in section 5.1.2 of 
this report. 
 
4.3. Summary 
Section 3 demonstrated that there was a clear divergence of approaches to the 
funding, regulation, investment and operation across different modes of transport. 
Each network or mode has its own regulatory environment which has developed 
somewhat independently of the others. This section has demonstrated the 
importance of the network of actors surrounding different decisions and the 
connection of the actors involved with the funding necessary to implement decisions. 
The process of devolution and the move to the new public management principles in 
creating a wholly-owned government company in the form of Highways England, 
subject to external economic regulation from the ORR (see Docherty et al., 2018b), 
has led to a divergence in the configurations of these networks across the UK. To 
understand which factors really matter to decision-making therefore requires a clear 
understanding of the context of the decision. 
Nonetheless, while parts of the transport system are privately owned and parts 
publicly owned, there are some common themes which are important to all 
investment decisions: 
• Identification of a clear need 
• Developed consensus across key actors 
• A clear funding channel 
While it is possible to point to examples of privately led initiatives which have been 
delivered (e.g. Liverpool2 port expansion) with good joint working between the 
private provider and the public sector, there are examples where this has not been 
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effective. For example, while there is a clear need identified for airport expansion in 
the South East of England and a willingness by the competing airports to fund such 
developments, the political consensus necessary is not in place.  This has hampered 
progress over the period since the 2002 Airports White Paper. So, it is not a simple 
question of public versus privately driven leadership which matters. 
In road and rail, where public sector investment dominates, the issues relate to a 
large degree to the development of a consensus across key actors and then relative 
prioritisation of need within a fixed budget. There are more new schemes to develop 
and pinch points to fix than funds available. While there is a national methodology 
(with some variation across devolved administrations) to look at the case for different 
projects, this does not fully resolve the public policy questions which shape how 
investment packages are developed. Here, the arguments of strategic need can be 
articulated differently by different local or regional actors and there is inevitably a 
competition for funding. While some of the restructuring of governance has helped to 
clarify the key actors in the network and given them control over the process (e.g. 
Transport for London and Transport Scotland), this is not so easily repeated in 
England. In all cases, boundary issues will always exist so it seems that focusing on 
managing those issues in an effective way will help. It is too early to say if new 
bodies such as Transport for the North will achieve this. 
As discussed further in section 5, funding also matters and longer-term funding 
settlements for the road and rail networks and better planning from devolved 
agencies results in a more certain pipeline. This ensures that once the work on 
defining the case is largely done it progresses rather than stalling, ultimately 
requiring cases to be remade over again further down the line. 
The UK has traditionally had a standard approach to assessing the benefits of 
publicly funded transport investments. The assessment methods in Wales, England 
and Scotland have diverged to a degree since devolution although the core 
benefit:cost ratio methods remain aligned. The £4 billion of spending in Scotland and 
Wales is therefore spent on priorities which are shaped differently to those in 
England. With greater devolution to cities and combined authorities in England there 
is scope to debate whether there may be a further shift from centralised to 
decentralised responsibility for ensuring funds are well spent. As an example, the 
rejection of the Leeds NGT trolleybus system in 2016 was the end of a 25-year 
process which initially proposed a tram system. This had been rejected by the 
Department for Transport in November 2004 following cost increases. A subsequent 
trolleybus scheme was rejected in public inquiry and this was upheld by the 
Secretary of State in 2016. In total it is estimated that scheme development costs 
were £70 million over the period (CIHT, 2016). The Department for Transport instead 
awarded £173.5 million for bus improvements. The tensions between national 
oversight of expenditure and re-visiting decisions to ensure good value for money 
and local determination of priorities are clearly shown, but this tension is present for 
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all major local schemes. Should accountability for spend reside with the local or 
national level and, if both, then what is the right balance?  
Given the structures and ways of working in place today, Section 5 reviews the 
evidence on what works and where the key ‘pain points’ in the decision-making 
system are. Section 6 looks ahead to the period to 2040 and offers some insights 
into how new innovations will challenge the existing structures and rule sets and how 
this might present opportunities to overcome some of the barriers highlighted in 
section 5 as well as creating new issues to address.  
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5. Outcomes from the system: 
Strengths and Challenges 
 
This section reviews some key strengths arising from the review of current 
governance arrangements before identifying some of the governance challenges 
which the existing arrangements generate. The strengths and weaknesses were 
identified by the topic experts as part of their brief, and a full list can be found in each 
section of the Technical Annex. While these are all based on evidence and 
experience in the field, they are inevitably coloured by the views of the experts. At 
the workshop on 27 November 2017 participants were asked to identify gaps or 
additional points, to challenge the list produced and to prioritise them in importance. 
While again this is influenced by the participants who attended relative to those who 
did not (ports, airports and freight were particularly under-represented), our aim was 
to focus down on some more important matters rather than be comprehensive or to 
imply prioritisation of factors. 
 
5.1. Strengths 
As Eddington set out in his 2006 review of the UK transport system, it moves a 
‘staggering number’ of journeys a year and ‘in broad terms it provides the right 
connections, in the right places, to support the journeys that matter to economic 
performance’ (Eddington, 2006, p.1).  Participants at the workshop identified that 
there are clear pressures on the transport system in different places and at different 
times of the day. Some places have gaps in transport provision (CBT, 2013) and for 
many travel is expensive (Mattioli et al., 2018). However, in reviewing strengths and 
challenges it is important to start from a recognition that the system in place today 
offers better connectivity than in many of our European neighbours (Eddington, 
2006). 
5.1.1. The importance of transport has been recognised in increasing capital 
spending 
UK public expenditure on transport has fluctuated considerably over time, as shown 
in Figure 25. The fluctuations are for a range of reasons. In the 1990s for example 
the UK Government approached the rail network as something to be managed in an 
on-going decline (Shaw and Docherty, 2013). The period from 1997 onwards saw 
New Labour cut back on spending in line with the previous Conservative 
administration’s spending plans, but also saw a shift away from the 1989 Roads for 
Prosperity major road expansion programme. 
In particular, in the years following the recession of 2008, governments in the UK 
have recognised the importance of infrastructure to supporting economic 
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development, particularly in the light of extensive pressure from population growth 
and housing growth rather than growth in personal travel. The UK shifted from 
spending around 0.2% of GDP on roads between 2004 and 2013 (around 40% lower 
than Germany and 50% lower than France over the same period) to spending 0.3% 
by 2015 (15% higher than France and Germany),10 with commitments to further 
expansion. Rail expenditure has been higher than France and Germany over the 
same period although the costs of construction, operations and new investment in 
the UK remain far higher (estimated at 40% higher in 2011), in part due to the older 
network assets but also due to industry structure (McNulty, 2011; HM Treasury and 
Infrastructure UK, 2010). 
 
Figure 25: Spend on Transport as a Percentage of GDP (data: Transport 
Statistics Great Britain) 
There is now a clear pipeline of projects in transport as shown in Figure 26. While 
this covers both public and private expenditure, 87% of this is publicly funded, 7% 
public/private partnerships and 6% private. 
                                                           
10 Data taken from https://data.oecd.org/transport/infrastructure-investment.htm 
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Figure 26: Combined Public and Private Sector Infrastructure Projected Capital 
Spend for Transport 2016/17-2020/2111 (IPA, 2016) 
 
5.1.2. Longer term spending commitments allow for better planning and 
delivery 
 
There has been a shift towards longer-term funding of national networks. The shift 
from the Highways Agency to Highways England was undertaken following the Cook 
Review (2011). That review identified the difficulties which the previous annualised 
funding arrangements created for investment planning with variations leading to 
stop-start funding and loss of efficiency with suppliers. The five-year Rail Investment 
Strategy (RIS) process on the rail network across the UK is now mirrored on the 
Strategic Road Network. In Scotland, a different approach has been adopted with 
three-year indicative funding allocations for Transport Scotland. There has also been 
a clear and consistent pipeline approach to projects and this has also aided delivery. 
It was suggested that a clear infrastructure pipeline is also important in creating 
organisations that are attractive to skilled staff and that this builds a virtuous circle of 
improved policy, project and programme development. We cannot verify that, but 
can point to organisations which are effective in their delivery such as Transport for 
London, Transport Scotland, Highways England and Transport for Greater 
Manchester where this seems to hold true. 
This longer-term approach also has value at a local level but is only very partially 
achieved. The shift to Combined Authorities and agreements for City Deals leads to 
greater certainty over some of the capital programme spend. The Tees Valley 
Combined Authority (TVCA) case study (see chapter 2.4, Technical Annex) shows 
that the mayor and the TVCA have access to a single pot for investment in transport 
                                                           
11 NPIF Transport – National Productivity Investment Fund 
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with a commitment for an investment fund of £15 million per year over 30 years. In 
addition there are several funding streams which are subject to fluctuation including: 
Integrated Transport Block (formula funding); Highways Maintenance Block (formula 
funding); Highway Maintenance incentive funding; National Productivity Investment 
Fund (2017/18 only); Pothole Action Fund; and the Transforming Cities Fund. 
 
5.1.3. Cities are being given more powers and are starting to be more 
ambitious 
 
Transport for London is recognised as a globally leading transport authority (NYC, 
2008). Twenty years ago it did not exist and was a fragmented set of agencies 
responsible for bus, underground and traffic signals. The combination of the right 
powers, funding commitment, democratic accountability, leadership and political will 
has ensured that the high-quality networks and favourable regulatory environment 
have been capitalised on to deliver major transport improvements and an integrated 
system piloting new technologies.  
There are early signs of evidence that this may be starting to happen in other cities. 
Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) has developed a vision for 2040 (TfGM, 
2016) and is delivering a major investment programme to improve the transport 
experience and economic function of the city region, led now by an elected mayor. 
The integration of Local Enterprise Partnerships and Transport Authorities together 
in Combined Authorities brings greater opportunity to connect transport investments 
to their broader goals (see also West Yorkshire Combined Authority Case Study in 
the Technical Annex, chapter 2.3). 
While the devolution agenda appears to support the creation of stronger cities, the 
ingredients of leadership, strategy and funding are also evident in other places. 
Nottingham City Council, for example, remains the only city to have introduced a 
Workplace Parking Levy and is using the revenue to support the growth of its tram 
network as part of a broader integrated transport and growth strategy (NCC, 2011). 
These elements have also been found to be important in European cities with good 
transport networks (Docherty et al., 2009). Part of the reason that progress in 
developing urban transport has been less impressive than envisaged by successive 
governments is the continued dislocation between the transport and land use 
planning powers; these are often better integrated in the legislative frameworks of 
continental countries. Many UK cities have struggled to align transport investments 
with coherent land use frameworks strong enough to resist the kind of (mainly out-of-
town) developments that encourage greater car use and are difficult to serve by 
public transport12. 
                                                           
12 See http://www.transportworks.org/evidence-base/transport-and-land-use for a discussion and 
reading list on this issue  
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5.1.4. Transport markets are professionally regulated with good 
interoperability and safety records 
 
Many examples were provided across the different modal expert reports regarding 
the high quality of the regulation of transport industries in the UK. Transport networks 
are natural monopolies and so require effective regulation. The Civil Aviation 
Authority is recognised as a global leader in its field (DfT, 2008) and the Office of 
Rail and Road provides an evidence-led scrutiny of progress against efficiency 
targets for Network Rail and Highways England. Increasing voice is being given to 
the consumer as part of the regulatory process with Transport Focus taking on a 
broader remit. 
In the freight industry, while it is true that there is a diverse range of potential 
infringements and therefore jurisdictions responsible for these, there have been 
many examples of effective multi-agency approaches. This includes simultaneous 
checking for vehicle condition and licensing, overloading, driving hours, tachograph 
offences, taxation offences and illegal immigration (Commercial Fleet, 2017). 
Although the devolution of transport powers has become more important over time, 
there has been a retention of powers to ensure interoperability of systems and joint 
liaison between governments to oversee practical aspects of knowledge sharing to 
ensure the UK transport system remains fully interoperable. This seems set to 
continue in importance as the transport system becomes increasingly intelligent and 
automated (e.g. for new Vehicle Type Approval procedures become necessary). 
Through a combination of effective regulation and commitment to improvements in 
the operation and maintenance of the transport system, the UK’s safety record for 
transport is very good across all modes. Only Sweden, Switzerland and Norway 
have fewer road deaths per million population than the UK out of 37 comparator EU 
and other international countries (TSGB, 2016). It was however, noted that progress 
has stalled to some degree and that pedestrian and cycling safety rates compare 
poorly to other countries at the top of the league table such as Sweden and the 
Netherlands (PACTS, 2017). 
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5.2. Challenges 
 
5.2.1. Siloes persist between transport and other policy areas  
 
People travel to take part in activities such as employment, health and leisure. 
Transport policy is not just about the regulation and management of the system and 
the modes in the system but also about these wider connections. There are benefits 
to other areas of public policy resulting from some transport interventions (e.g. 
agglomeration effects for business (Graham, 2007) and health benefits from walking 
and cycling (Panter et al., 2016) 
There are also costs when transport is difficult to access or costly-in terms of 
unemployment, missed health appointments and limited travel horizons to seek out 
opportunities (Lucas et al., 2016).  
This is not new (Hull, 2005). In particular misalignment between spatial areas 
responsible for land-use and transport planning and different timescales of 
processes in both areas have long-existed (Headicar, 2009). Integration of the Local 
Enterprise Partnerships and Transport Authorities is a positive recognition of the 
need to achieve the synergies between transport and economic development (see 
WYCA Case Study in Technical Annex, chapter 2.3). In addition, public health is now 
more closely integrated within local government across Great Britain (Heath, 2014 
and Scottish Government, 2008). However, while the aspirations for more integrated 
cross-sectoral planning remain, it appears to be difficult to achieve in practice. 
As section 3 of this report explained, the regulatory structures and incentive 
structures in place for investment in road and rail have been developed through 
legitimate concerns about how to regulate natural monopolies to achieve efficient 
outcomes. Ports and airport decisions are largely motivated by profit concerns and 
there are more limited points of national strategy leverage. While capital expenditure 
has grown, particularly on national networks, funds for local transport expenditure 
and service support, have diminished. Thus, the concerns which shaped the 
transport decision-making processes we have in place today were not built to 
establish the contribution towards or necessarily achieve these wider connections. 
This of course is not just a problem for the transport sector but also for the related 
sectors such as health, social care, employment and housing. The squeeze on 
public sector resource funding has placed pressure on staffing across all service 
areas (Stewart, 2012) while demands on services may also be growing (e.g. Maguire 
et al., 2016). This may put pressure on any activities which are not seen as core 
tasks. There is recognition of shared issues and of the potential for expenditure in 
one area to save costs in another (e.g. Mueller et al., 2016 and Greener Journeys, 
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2016). However, a substantial change in approach has yet to be delivered through 
the existing structures. 
 
5.2.2. The governance environment has become more complex in England 
 
As identified in section 4, there will always be tensions between the extent to which 
schemes are local, regional, inter-regional or national in importance. Two opposing 
patterns have emerged outside of Northern Ireland (which has the simplest structures 
but which does not seem replicable). In Wales and Scotland the national tier has 
strengthened its role with, essentially a two-tier national/local set up for spending, and 
regional tiers having a largely advisory role where they exist. In England, there has 
been a strengthening of the regional tier of governance through LEPs and an increase 
in Combined Authorities which operate over multiple local authorities. The advent of 
Transport for the North may mark a broader establishment of a further layer of 
governance, with calls for such arrangements to be replicated elsewhere in England. 
City devolution is also leading to a difference in powers and funding agreements 
across each of the areas as part of the agreed deals. There are, therefore, new voices 
in the debate on spending priorities and also new geographies over which boundary 
disputes or political arguments need to play out. It is too early to say whether this will 
improve decision-making. 
Some of the Combined Authorities have been established with elected mayors, 
although this is not the case for all. It will be important to understand whether these 
arrangements produce the anticipated improvement in strategic direction and delivery. 
In the Tees Valley Combined Authority (see chapter 2.4 of Technical Annex) for 
example, the mayor is of a different political party to the constituent local authority 
members. This type of arrangement could stymie progress (although there is no 
evidence of that to date). 
While strategic decision-making bodies have been enhanced at higher tiers, there has 
been little change to the lowest tiers of government. As yet, for example, each district 
authority in the metropolitan area establishes its own taxi and PHV licensing approach 
and these differ across a city such as Manchester (Linton and Bray, 2017). Only in 
London, where this was established at the outset of London devolution, is there a 
Strategic Road Network managed by the overarching transport authority. The net 
effect of all of these changes is a layering up of complexity in England. 
 
5.2.3. The Current Spending Pattern Distribution will be Difficult to Maintain 
 
There is a growth profile for investment in transport, as identified in section 5.1.1. This, 
combined with longer-term funding commitments for Highways England to go with that 
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of Network Rail is identified as a positive. However, some very significant funding 
tensions exist today and these seem likely to become more significant. 
First, while high priority has been given to the Strategic Road Network (SRN), despite 
recent additional funding pots, industry figures suggest the maintenance backlog for 
local roads has risen to £12.06 billion and the annual shortfall is £730 million (AIA, 
2017). There are also some very substantial disparities across the UK. England 
spends 30% more per mile on local roads than Wales.  Greater spend is likely given 
its larger population.  The North West spends around 60% more per mile than the East 
Midlands and the South West 
(see Figure 10). However, the breakdown across seemingly similar areas suggests 
that the differences will not all be down to different local road geographies and need. 
While the issues are different for the SRN compared to the local road network (e.g. 
the SRN has much larger freight flows) the total spend per mile on the SRN is 34 times 
that per mile on the local road network in Scotland and 29 times the local spend per 
mile in England (2015/16 figures).  
Second, while the capital funding pot is planned to expand, there has been a sharp 
decline in the revenue resources supporting the delivery of local transport such as 
socially necessary bus services, road safety interventions and behaviour change 
measures (e.g. school travel plan officers) (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: Declining revenue resources for local government (data Department 
for Transport: transport expenditure, 2017)   
(Source: DfT 2017, Table TSGB1302) 
As described in section 3.5 a 27% drop in net supported for buses has resulted in a 
40% reduction in supported bus service miles due to the shift of resources required 
to fund the mandatory concessionary fares policy. 
On the rail network, around 70% of the costs are covered by fares. Regulated fares 
for 2018 will increase above inflation as part of a longer-run approach of shifting the 
Unadjusted local government transport spend (revenue/ 
resource) reduction (%) 2009/10 to 2015/16 
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balance of funding rail away from Government. A continued rebalancing towards the 
fare payer will become increasingly politically difficult. However, this increase also 
overlooks the very different performance of the different franchises in terms of 
subsidy. Figure 28 shows net funding positions for a sample of franchises. If the dark 
blue part of the bar is above the 0% line then operating the services requires 
subsidy. All of the infrastructure funding falls above the line (i.e. requires state 
funding). The bar shows whether the income from fares offsets the infrastructure 
costs. The only franchise which does this here is South Western with Thameslink 
and East Coast more or less breaking even (2% funding required). However, the GB 
average is 21% contribution and it is as high as 54% for ScotRail. 
 
Figure 28: Net funding position of a sample of rail franchises (ORR, 2017a) 
Overall then, despite a positive picture for national road and rail investment, there is 
the potential for shortfalls in funding which help deliver local and regional transport 
schemes and in particular to give authorities the opportunities to steer the sort of 
services they want to provide. Local road maintenance funding, relative to national, is 
a growing concern. It was suggested at the workshop on funding that there should be 
greater transparency on the requirements to fund and maintain the networks and 
operations we have today before further committing to capital expansion projects. 
 
5.2.4. The changing way in which we pay for motoring 
 
The improvements in vehicle engine technology necessary to begin the pathway 
towards meeting our climate change commitments have seen a 5% decline in the 
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amount of fuel consumed since the peak in 2007, despite a 3.1% increase in miles 
travelled. The Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that fuel duties will decline as 
a percentage of GDP up to 2021/22 as shown in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Fuel Duty Forecast as a percentage of GDP (source: Office for 
Budget Responsibility, n.d.) 
 
It is important to note that fuel duty is not a hypothecated source of income for 
transport and any loss in revenue from fuel duty could be either accepted or 
alternatively filled by other tax adjustments. However, this trend still matters for 
transport in (at least) four ways: 
• The sector has always made a case that it more than covers its costs and 
investment in transport therefore commands support, at least amongst 
motorists and the haulage industry; 
• The demand for transport responds to price signals, with a short run elasticity 
estimate of -0.3 and long run of -0.6 (Goodwin et al., 2004). A fall in per-mile 
costs of travel would, all other things be equal, encourage more driving and 
therefore place greater pressures on the network for maintenance and 
investment. 
• The demand for other modes of transport would fall if motoring becomes 
relatively cheaper as it has been observed to do since 2013 (TSGB, 2016). 
• This loss will accelerate rapidly when there is a more rapid shift to electric and 
plug-in electric hybrid vehicles. Domestic electricity is currently only charged 
VAT at 5%. Latest analysis suggests that without any further policy 
intervention this would be between 2020 and 2025 for full electric vehicles and 
2025 and 2030 for Plug-In Hybrid (Palmer et al., 2018). 
It is a policy choice about whether and, if so, how to respond to this change. The 
decisions about how it is done and by whom are substantial governance challenges. 
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How will this work in different devolved administrations and will the relationship 
between local and national charging be considered? These issues do not arise with 
simple flat rate taxation at the pump. This issue will also be important to the freight 
industry as it will impact on fleet purchasing strategies and the relative 
competitiveness of multi-modal supply chains. 
  
5.2.5. Other Issues 
 
The four challenges set out above are not an exhaustive list of governance 
challenges in the transport sector just as the list of the strengths was also narrowed 
down. Each of the expert reports in the Technical Annex set out around three 
challenges that seem important. Many relate to specific modes or networks, and this 
is why they were not included in the overarching four topics. Some examples which, 
in the view of the authors, seem particularly worthy of further exploration include: 
1. The regulation of new technology (particularly drones) which could be important 
for both the freight industry and also from an aviation perspective. There are 
also broader social implications at stake. 
2. A source of uncertainty is the nature of Britain’s future trading relationships. In 
terms of air transport, in the future the UK Government may have to assume 
greater responsibility for some or all of the following: regulatory formation and 
oversight, safety compliance and auditing, environmental safeguarding, airfield, 
airframe and aircrew licensing and certification, air service agreements with 
third party countries, and consumer protection and competition functions.  
3. Continuing reforms to the road and rail sectors. In the case of road, DfT 
(2017d) announced that it would consult on plans to introduce a ‘Major Road 
Network’ for England. The MRN would comprise of local roads of strategic 
importance (for example key A roads) and it is proposed that this network could 
access a ring-fenced funding stream arising from the proceeds of Vehicle 
Exercise Duty (VED), in addition to Highways England’s road network.  Such a 
proposal is immediately confronted with the issues of a multi-level decision-
making environment. Firstly, ownership of MRN roads which were local roads is 
proposed to remain with local authorities. However, decisions on investment 
will require input from various governance levels. This may be at City Region or 
Pan-Regional level, but also at the national level. On the rail network, recent 
announcements suggest that future franchises might have a more diverse set 
of arrangements with the potential for some vertical integration of track and 
operations (Grayling, 2017). Some of these reforms have been advocated 
previously (e.g. McNulty, 2011) but will still require the tension between local 
and regional governmental preferences and track and train operations to be 
managed.  
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6. What might change out to 2040? 
This section looks ahead to 2040 and considers how the governance implications of 
the introduction of a set of technologies that include: 
• ‘The shift towards ‘Mobility as a Service’ (MaaS), where individuals’ ownership 
of vehicles is increasingly replaced by “usership”, that is the ability to 
purchase access rights to an interoperable package of mobility services (car, 
taxi, bus, rail, bike share) owned by others, usually corporate, providers. This 
is facilitated by integrated aggregation and payment platforms, with intensive 
processing of ‘big data’ to match provision to demand in real time (see 
Thakuriah et al., 2016); 
• New user-generated and user-centred information that is context specific and 
integrates mobility and non-mobility options, and which draws upon crowd-
sourced, real-time data (see Toole et al., 2015); 
• Increasingly ‘intelligent’ infrastructure, including connected vehicles, which 
derives operational information from users and provides feedback in real-time 
to influence traveller behaviour and optimise system performance (see Alam 
et al., 2016); 
• The electrification of the vehicle fleet using battery power, plug-in hybrid 
and/or other new technologies. Combined with a smart energy distribution 
grid, electric vehicles could be both emission free at the point of use and also 
be part of the electricity storage solution for the widespread adoption of 
renewables more generally in pursuit of decarbonisation objectives (see 
Coronado Mondragon et al., 2015); 
• Automated vehicles that do not require ‘driving’ by any of the passengers, and 
which enable all occupants of the vehicle to focus on other tasks whilst they 
are in motion (see Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015, Docherty et al., 2017). 
Some of these developments may be stand-alone but others will work in parallel, for 
example driverless taxis may be an important part of accelerating Mobility as a 
Service. 
In looking at these technologies, this report draws on the description of the 
governance system and its strengths and challenges today. However, as the future 
is uncertain, this section should be seen as a set of evidence-based contentions 
rather than observable realities. Where possible we present options for action 
recognising that there is a spectrum of positions the state can adopt from more 
interventionist to more laissez-faire.  
The section draws on a combination of workshop inputs from both project workshops 
and three additional expert reports which were commissioned following the 
workshops on Futures (Professor Iain Docherty), Automation (Professor Oliver 
Carsten) and Funding (Dr John Nellthorp). In different places throughout the 
Technical Annex, the contributing experts have highlighted the importance of good 
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technical regulation and interoperability considerations for new technologies. This 
was identified as a strength of the UK governance system in section 5.1.4 and this 
report does not cover that further, although it is clearly important. 
6.1.1. Reasons for state intervention 
 
Before reflecting on how the advent of new technologies impacts on governance it is 
worth reflecting on why the state is involved in intervening in the transport market 
and, therefore, why it might still continue to do so or what might it do differently.  
summarises the reasons for intervention and the issues which make those reasons 
relevant today. In reviewing the list however, it is difficult to see which of these 
issues will not continue to be important. The reasons for state intervention in 
transport are robust; it is the context in which they are delivered that is changing. 
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Table 5: Core Reasons for State Involvement in Transport Governance 
(source: Docherty et al., 2018) 
Need for intervention Key Issues today 
Public policy 
1. Setting overall direction 
of policy 
Increasing recognition of the role of transport in 
supporting economic growth, social progress and 
health. 
2. Environmental, 
economic and social 
externalities exist 
Climate change, air quality, congestion, social 
exclusion and inequity are not tackled through the 
market. 
3. Coordination of 
transport, land-use and 
economic goals 
Planning to accommodate growth in many cities while 
maintaining or improving accessibility requires 
intervention. 
4. Setting standards and 
communicating with public 
about transport system 
operation 
Defining levels of service and reporting on how these 
are met, justifying efficient spending of taxation, 
managing disruptive events. 
5. Balancing the needs of 
different transport systems 
and users 
Decisions on infrastructure spend and maintenance, 
road space allocation and legal frameworks on rights. 
Market failures 
6. Conditions for a free 
market do not exist 
Managing monopoly infrastructure providers and 
limited service competition, preventing collusion. 
7. Acting as a provider or 
procurer of services which 
are not profitable 
Often to ensure basic levels of service to some 
communities, evening and weekend services or for 
bespoke services such as school or hospital transport. 
8. Problems of co-
ordination between modes 
exist 
Competition can exist between public transport 
operators within and between modes. Limited ticketing 
integration.  
9. Basic standards of 
operation and rules of 
movement 
Interoperability between systems, data, 
standardisation of laws and enforcement. 
Investment as policy 
10. Funding the provision 
and upkeep of 
infrastructure 
Sets general taxes and mobility-related taxes and 
charges at various levels of government to fund the 
upkeep of infrastructure and subsidy of some 
services. The state can borrow at lower rates than the 
private sector. 
11. Supporting the 
adoption of transport 
innovations 
Innovations are sometimes expensive in their early 
stage adoption or require additional infrastructures, 
supported by state subsidy and investment or new 
regulation. 
12. The state is an 
aggregator of risk and has 
primary accountability 
The state ultimately remains guarantor when private 
provision of public services fails and retains 
accountability via the ballot box. 
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From a governance perspective, the list of innovations at the start of this section 
change a number of things: 
• The network of actors and stakeholders involved in delivering transport 
• The technologies and, therefore, operational rules for the transport system 
• Who holds knowledge about what is happening in the transport system and 
therefore the power dynamics in the system 
• The business models underpinning transport, the way it is paid for and who is 
involved in channelling that revenue 
• The relationship between the user and the provider, and in turn the state, as 
users become more active participants in the transport system. 
The following sections look at some of the implications of these changes, given the 
on-going need for state intervention. 
 
6.1.2. The Old and the New 
 
It is necessary to imagine what opportunities new technologies could bring, and this 
is  discussed further below. The focus of the companies seeking to deploy new 
technologies is to try and realise some of these opportunities, but there is a much 
wider transition for the existing regime of actors and technologies that also needs to 
be managed (Geels, 2012). 
For example, automation, particularly in the form of driverless vehicles, is likely to 
have very substantial wider impacts in the medium and longer terms (Turnball, 
2015). These are likely to affect economic growth, energy use, social equity, liveable 
cities and living streets, access to employment, residential location choice, healthy 
lifestyles, sociability, travel intensity and mode choice. Effects that have been 
identified as potentially relevant include: 
• competition with urban public transport, particularly buses; 
• competition with rail for longer distance trips; 
• increased intensity of motorised traffic; 
• attractiveness of travel by motorised means which would result on decreased 
use of healthy modes (see Alermi et al. (2018) for early evidence from San 
Francisco); 
• encouragement of long-distance commuting and urban sprawl; and 
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• substantial impacts on employment from the automation of freight transport 
and taxi driving. (see Wadud et al., 2016; Beede et al., 2017) 
The UK Government wants to see driverless vehicles without a safety attendant on 
the UK’s roads by 2021 (BBC News, 2017). If this comes to pass then the impacts of 
automation could begin, for example, to have an impact on the demand forecasts of 
rail franchises from the early 2020s. Such impacts should really be being discussed 
with the rail industry now and how to share any resultant revenue risk. Because 
many investments and decisions in transport have a long-term element to them it 
may be desirable to take a pro-active stance and confront some of the potential 
implications before they are actually observable. 
While it seems necessary to organise much of the regulatory oversight of 
autonomous vehicles at a UK-wide scale, the vehicles will operate on local streets 
and, as such, there is scope for different local authorities to take different 
approaches as to how to manage this, as today with the current private car. It will be 
possible to restrict access to specific areas or to allow access to particular lanes or 
to charge differential rates for access at different times of day. Much as with the 
Swedish approach to congestion charging referenced in section 4.1.3, it would seem 
sensible to have common protocols to integrate local access management into 
autonomous systems even though the flavour and detail of the implementation will 
vary. 
These are just two of the many issues which need addressing. How should planning 
respond? Will this radically change what travel to work areas look like and therefore 
the spatial scales over which it makes sense to plan for transport? Where might 
freight hubs relocate? There is currently an understandable focus on the governance 
arrangements to permit autonomous vehicles on the UK’s roads. However, these 
seem likely to be the thin end of a much bigger wedge of associated impacts that will 
require adaptations to regulations or governance approaches.  
 
6.1.3. Rethinking Regulation 
 
The workshop explored four scenarios with different degrees of government 
intervention and different levels of technological progress. One common theme in 
each scenario was the need for government to present a refreshed vision of what 
regulation and policy intervention are for and also importantly, not for. There was 
consensus that our current complex combination of highly asymmetric governance 
models (section 4) and mixed public/private ownership of transport operations 
(section 3) was the result of a number of long-running and often independent and 
historically rooted processes. The potential for change inherent in smart mobility -in 
types of transport mode, service quality, distributional impact, pricing and so on  -
was so great that it was agreed that state would have to bring some kind of clarity to 
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its regulatory role.  Without this clarity, the political economy of smart implementation 
might become very difficult to manage and could generate problematic externalities.   
The advent of an autonomous pod provides a useful thought experiment. If such a 
vehicle is not owned by an individual then what sort of an asset is it? There is 
currently a distinction between private transport (e.g. your own car or motorbike) and 
public transport (e.g. bus, rail and taxi). A pod which is shared with other people 
might neatly fit in to the definition of what we currently see as public transport but 
how then would we class an individual travelling by themselves in such a vehicle? 
This is in effect the same as taking a taxi today but without a driver. Such distinctions 
matter to how roadspace is allocated and where subsidy is channelled in the system. 
Rather than bus and taxi lanes it might be preferable to switch over to management 
by occupancy (for which precedent exists with High Occupancy Vehicle lanes). 
There are also arguments for subsidy to follow the user or to be targeted to specific 
parts of the network (e.g. feeder taxi type services to mainline public transport, as 
has been trialled in the US (Linton and Bray, 2017) rather than to be channelled by 
mode. 
Kamargianni et al. (2016) review the different stages of development of Mobility as a 
Service (MaaS). These services can involve, in their most developed forms, access 
to multiple modes with ticket integration, payment integration, booking and journey 
planning services and subscription-based models where you buy access to a pre-set 
amount of mobility as with a mobile phone data and calls bundle. As noted in 
sections 3 and 4, achieving an integrated transport system in the UK has proven 
difficult, partly because the markets have been established to be in competition. 
MaaS could change this or could be seen to be an opportunity to change aspects of 
the system which do not work today. Again, as a thought experiment, consider a city 
where MaaS has become widespread. The traveller’s relationship will be with their 
MaaS provider as much as the specific modes they use. How many MaaS providers 
might there be and could they exert market power over the operators and the 
travellers? Should the MaaS providers be regulated and how would this change the 
regulatory framework for the existing providers? This might depend on how involved 
the state is in providing any of the services or in integrating the ticketing and so may 
look quite different in London where there is full control to somewhere like 
Huddersfield where there is limited scope for influence. Some cities are pro-actively 
planning for the mobility in their area to move towards a more on-demand MaaS-
based model (see TfGM, 2017). Early engagement might have some benefits in 
overcoming barriers to the MaaS market developing, while setting a framework fit for 
purpose in the longer run if it becomes established. How anticipatory or how 
responsive governments should be is a dilemma. While intervening too early risks 
stifling innovation, intervention may also help overcome some of the longer-run 
barriers to integration identified throughout this report. 
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We note that Finland, rather than seeking to conduct such a reform from the start 
point of existing regulations, has created a new Transport Code which seeks to be 
technology neutral and to create a level playing field across modes (Berner, 2017). 
Finally, although public transport and aviation have deployed peak pricing to various 
degrees for a long time, this has also emerged more clearly in urban transport with 
surge pricing from Uber. As well as thinking through how technology allows for new 
or different ways of pricing, consideration also needs to be given to protecting the 
public interest. Transport markets are still likely to concentrate on the most dense 
areas so there is an on-going need to think about how to ensure sufficient access to 
mobility and to consider the case for intervening to limit prices for consumer 
protection. There will be a need to continue to correct for imperfections in the 
transport market and to protect low-income groups but these needs will likely change 
with the market.  
 
6.1.4. Managing the Use of Roads 
 
Early assessments of autonomous vehicles and integrated mobility as a service 
options have a very wide range of potential outcomes associated with them. For 
example, an assessment of the potential impact of AVs in travel demand in the US 
showed a range of +5% to +60% (Wadud et al., 2016). The International Transport 
Forum have been evaluating the impacts of a shift to on-demand mobility system 
linked to mainline public transport in an urban context (ITF-CPB, 2015). Here, the 
outcomes vary radically with the assumptions made about whether all or just some 
people sign up to the system and whether the vehicles are used by individuals or 
shared (see Table 6). The best outcome is an increase in traffic-kilometres of 9% 
while the worst case is an increase of 103%.13 
 
 
  
                                                           
13 In general there is a reduction in the vehicle fleet size. In many scenarios congestion is reduced 
due to more effective use of space and the increase in kilometres is in part due to the distances 
travelled to relocate vehicles. 
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Table 6: Peak Hour Traffic Volume Changes in Lisbon under different 
Autonomous Taxi Futures (ITS-CPB, 2015) 
Change in Fleet Scenario Car kms 
(million) 
% of Baseline 
0% self-driving cars Baseline 1.04  
100% shared self-
driverless fleet 
With ride sharing 
and high capacity 
public transport 
1.13 109% 
Vehicle but not ride 
sharing no high 
capacity public 
transport 
2.11 203% 
50% private car use 
for motorised trips 
With ride sharing 
and high capacity 
public transport 
1.35 136% 
Vehicle but not ride 
sharing no high 
capacity public 
transport 
2.04 197% 
 
The International Transport Forum (ITF) conclude that governance reforms to how 
the transport system is managed are critical to ensuring that the benefits of these 
new technologies accrue to everyone, including non-users, and do not lead to a 
deterioration of conditions. In particular, the lessons from their exercise suggest a 
need to: 
• ensure integration rather than competition with mainline public transport 
• put in place measures which ensure that a more shared rather than 
individualised model emerges 
• in parallel put in place measures to change the way streets are managed to 
reflect the reduction in need for parking and the increase in drop offs and pick 
ups. 
This immediately suggests that there would need to be a common approach to 
managing such a system across a whole conurbation. As noted earlier (Linton and 
Bray, 2017), there is currently a fragmented approach to taxi and private hire 
regulation which would need to change.  
The ITF report also implies a more interventionist approach to ensuring integration 
across modes. While this is possible, it has proven difficult within the UK’s existing 
modal structures with notable exceptions (London and Northern Ireland in particular). 
There are other approaches which could be used to manage the use of roadspace 
and incentivise the sorts of outcomes authorities wish to see. Participants at the 
workshop saw the potential for new technologies to allow changes to be made to the 
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allocation of roadspace across the day as well as between modes and for there to be 
a different approach to charging for access to different areas (see below). Although it 
is too early to say what the impacts of new technology will be on travel patterns and 
use of vehicles, initial results suggest that a laissez-faire approach could lead to 
undesirable outcomes. 
 
6.1.5. Funding of and Paying for Travel 
 
Section 5.2 discussed the current divergence in how we pay for travel between 
modes as well as a likely decline in revenue from fuel duty. A shift towards 
autonomous vehicles will also impact on parking revenue which has been growing 
and currently yields a net profit for local authorities of £819 million (Leibling, 2017). 
Both workshops identified a need to fund additional costs of establishing new 
infrastructures or strengthening and improving existing infrastructures (local 
electricity grids and roads) to allow the deployment of both autonomous (Johnson, 
2017) and electric vehicles (Chestney, 2017). There would also be new on-going 
costs to be considered in running these systems. Different options exist for funding 
this: 
• general taxation – which would imply either a greater spend on transport or a 
redistribution of spending priorities within transport 
• household electricity bills – in the case of electric vehicle grid strengthening 
which would be paid by all households irrespective of whether or not they had 
an Electric Vehicle (EV) 
• user charges – where those using the facilities pay a premium to recover the 
costs of the additional provision. 
In reality a mix of all three may be necessary. Discussion at the funding workshop 
suggested that putting the whole burden on user charges would stifle acceleration in 
adoption which, in the case of EVs, would impact on progress towards climate 
change targets. If there is a desire to see EVs form part of the grid and to be used as 
storage then this will require a reform to some domestic energy tariffs. Similarly, 
there would be a desire to discourage drivers or fleets from all charging at existing 
peak periods which might be influenced by dynamic pricing. 
As noted in section 5.2.4 there are economic arguments to reform the way we pay 
for travel to ensure that the benefits afforded by new technology are not lost to a 
system where users face, to an even lesser extent than today, the true costs of 
moving around the network. The National Infrastructure Commission, in its 2017 
consultation on infrastructure priorities examined the route to meeting congestion, 
capacity and carbon goals. It concluded that ‘effective long-term policy to manage 
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congestion will need to incorporate pricing for roads’ and that a new pricing system 
was essential in reforming how we pay for roads (NIC, 2017, p. 74). The choices that 
are made about whether, when and how to reform how we pay for travel and how we 
will pay for the development and maintenance of the new infrastructures are very 
important. 
 
6.1.6. Who does what? 
 
A theme across this report has been the complexity of the governance arrangements 
for transport. There will continue to be strong arguments for aggregation of 
responsibilities at a pan-UK level to ensure effective safety and interoperability 
regulation of new systems, but beneath this the governance system is complex and it 
is less clear who should be responsible for what regarding different aspects of the 
new technologies. 
To help answer this question we observe that one of the major challenges facing the 
governance of transport is a diminishing resource base and staff with the skills 
necessary to plan for transport. Coupled with this is a growth in the range of skills 
sets necessary to be an intelligent client to tech companies and to manage an 
increasingly complex set of networks and technologies. While not all of this needs to 
be done by the public sector, the public sector will retain accountability for the 
decisions taken and therefore needs to be an informed and intelligent client. At this 
point therefore we can observe that the limited passing up of powers from lower tiers 
to larger area bodies is a potential problem. Rather than seeking to regulate PHVs at 
a city-wide level this remains at the districts. Would that be tenable with autonomous 
fleets of taxis? Similarly, only TfL has highways powers for a Strategic Road Network 
in its area. Will all local highways authorities have the skills and competencies to 
manage the transition to autonomous vehicles or could this be done more effectively 
and more cheaply by pooling teams and resources?  
Rather than seeking to answer the question of who does what here, we suggest that 
different tiers of governance need to work together, and with the private sector, to 
determine the advantages and disadvantages of holding competencies and 
responsibilities at different scales. It would seem sub-optimal if the transition in 
technology to 2040 was not accompanied by a change in the structures supporting 
that transition. The current structures were fixed well before these new opportunities 
emerged and may not be well aligned for their governance. 
 
6.1.7. Data 
We note here that while data emerged as an important issue in our workshop in York 
on 27 November 2017, the scope of the brief and time available meant we are only 
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able to flag this as a critical part of the governance debate. The future transport 
system will revolve around large amounts of data about personal users being 
exchanged between providers. These are challenging in their own right in terms of 
appropriate use and storage of such data and its on-going security. If such systems 
are to become integrated with public sector services such as health or social care for 
example then this becomes yet more challenging. We suggest that this is a major 
need for further consideration. 
 
6.1.8. Summary Reflection 
Looking out to 2040, new technologies appear to offer some significant 
transformative potential for the transport system. The different aspects reviewed in 
this section underline the importance of thinking about possible ‘end states’ in order 
to determine whether they are desirable. However, to reach any of these end states 
requires more thinking about how to govern the transition. The current complex of 
highly asymmetric governance models (section 4) and mixed public/private 
ownership of transport operations (section 3) was the result of a number of long-
running, often parallel developments.  
The smart mobility transition is an opportunity to remove or improve some of the 
challenges that the current structures create and to achieve goals which have shown 
to be difficult with the existing technologies, structures and incentives. However, 
doing this will be challenging as the exact timing, speed and nature of the changes 
are unclear and the new challenges seem set to come in parallel to, but could also 
impact on, the existing ones. The experts informing this report suggest that, without 
clarity about the regulatory role of the state and the position of the different 
authorities in managing different parts of the transition, delivering the benefits of 
smart mobility will be difficult and there may be some unwanted and difficult-to-
manage downsides. We note that Finland has taken a pro-active approach to 
‘rebooting’ the way in which it defines and manages transport operations. This, to us, 
seems like a useful model to consider. While it is not possible to say exactly how the 
smart mobility transition will happen, it should be possible to develop anticipatory 
regulation which provides:  
1. certainty to new technology providers about the rules of the game; and 
2. the necessary tools for government at various levels to steer the new 
technologies to serve the public good as well their own business needs. 
To do this would also require developing more of a public discussion as to what 
these technologies are for, why they might be beneficial and what the level of public 
support for different types of deployment might be. This is not currently happening 
(Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018). 
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The experience with the current transport system as well as the input of experts to 
our workshop and internationally (Marsden and Reardon, 2018) suggests that the 
stance which the state adopts will make a difference both to the pace and nature of 
the mobility system that emerges. For example, while fully integrated MaaS services 
promise integrated door-to-door journey experiences, this is not guaranteed. MaaS 
could instead mean having access to a range of modal options but for the system to 
function more or less as today with much more limited integration.  
Electrification of the vehicle fleet is likely to continue to need skilful and adaptive 
governance approaches to achieve the scale of ambition which the Government has 
set. Substantial electrification can occur without this pro-active approach but our 
workshops suggested there will be limits and increased risks of stranded assets and 
poor investment decisions. This suggests the need for a clear vision about the 
Future of Mobility around which the kind of regulatory framework suggested above is 
developed. Such a vision would best be developed taking account of the views of 
stakeholders at different spatial scales given the importance of devolution to the 
management of transport. It is here where attention could also be paid to ‘who does 
what’. 
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Annex A: Differences in National and Local Transport 
Responsibilities 
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Scotland (see http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-55_Transport_in_Scotland.pdf) 
Service UK Government (Reserved functions) 
Transport Scotland (an Executive Agency of 
the Scottish Government) 
Local authorities (powers may be 
implemented via Regional 
Transport Partnerships if LAs agree) 
Road network • The UK Government retains responsibility 
for road traffic law*, vehicle and driver 
licensing and taxation, public service 
vehicle operators and goods operators 
licensing and the regulation of road 
safety.  
• Driver and Vehicle Licensing (DVLA) 
Traffic Commissioners (appointed by UK 
Secretary of State) 
• Development, maintenance and 
management of the trunk road network 
• Speed limits and road signs devolved under 
Scotland Act (2016) 
*Exempted from reservation in road traffic 
law are sections 8 and 11 on drink drive limits 
[devolved in 2012]; sections 39 and 40 
(relating to road safety and training); and 
sections 157 to 159 (relating to payments for 
treatment of traffic casualties) of RTA 1988. 
 
Manage, maintain and enhance 
local highway network (including 
traffic signals and signs) 
Bus services • Bus operator licensing and enforcement, 
which is mainly provided through the 
offices of the Traffic Commissioners and 
associated agencies.  
 
• Sets policy framework for the provision of 
bus services in Scotland. 
• Administers and funds the national 
concessionary fares scheme for elderly and 
disabled people (under Transport 
(Scotland) Act 2005 and provides other 
funding streams for the provision of local 
bus services, e.g. bus service operators 
grant.  
 
• Provision of bus infrastructure, 
e.g. bus shelters and bus priority 
measures. 
• Provision of subsidies for socially 
necessary, non-commercial bus 
services.  
• Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 
enables LAs to create statutory 
bus quality partnerships. 
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Rail services (incl. 
light rail) 
• Oversight of Network Rail, which is a GB-
wide company wholly owned by the UK 
Secretary of State. 
• Letting and management of cross-border 
passenger rail franchises (excluding the 
Caledonian Sleeper services), which 
extend into Scotland.  
• ORR retains regulatory oversight of rail 
services in Scotland. 
 
• Letting, management and financial support 
of the ScotRail and Caledonian Sleeper 
franchises. Under Scotland Act (2016), 
Scottish Government is able to invite public 
sector bids for its rail franchises. 
• Setting the high-level strategy for the 
maintenance and enhancement of the 
Scottish rail infrastructure by Network Rail 
via the Scottish HLOS and SOFA.   
• Specification of and funding for 
maintaining and operating rail 
infrastructure in Scotland via Network Rail. 
Light rail etc. systems (such as the Edinburgh 
Tram and Glasgow Subway) are devolved and 
extension plans etc overseen by Scottish 
Government/Parliament 
 
• Consultees on rail developments. 
Influence on rail projects via the 
planning system. 
  
Governance of UK Transport Infrastructures 
111 
 
Wales (including substantial changes to the devolution settlement under the Wales Act (2017), which comes into force 1 April 2018, see 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/4/contents/enacted) 
 
Service UK Government (Reserved functions) Welsh Government Local Authorities 
Road network • The UK Government retains responsibility for 
road traffic law, vehicle and driver licensing 
and taxation, public service vehicle operators 
and goods operators licensing and the 
regulation of road safety.  
• Driver and Vehicle Licensing (DVLA) 
Traffic Commissioners (appointed by UK Secretary 
of State) 
 
 
 
• Development, maintenance and 
management of the trunk road 
network. 
• Speed limits and road signs 
devolved under Wales Act 
(2017). 
 
Manage, maintain and enhance 
local highway network (including 
traffic signals and signs). 
Bus services • Bus sector regulation including competitive 
model and activities of the Traffic 
Commissioners and associated agencies.  
 
• Sets policy framework for the 
provision of bus services in 
Wales. 
• Provides other funding streams 
for the provision of local bus 
services, e.g. bus service 
operators grant.  
• Registration of bus services to be 
devolved under Wales Act 
(2017). 
 
 
 
• Provision of bus infrastructure, 
e.g. bus shelters and bus priority 
measures. 
• Provision of subsidies for socially 
necessary, non-commercial bus 
services.  
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Rail services (incl. light 
rail) 
• Oversight of Network Rail, which is a GB-wide 
company wholly owned by the UK Secretary of 
State. 
• Funding for Network Rail activities in Wales. 
• Letting and management of cross-border 
passenger rail franchises e.g. Great Western.  
• ORR retains regulatory oversight of rail services 
in Wales. 
 
• Letting, management and 
financial support for rail services 
wholly within Wales devolved 
under Wales Act (2017). 
 
• Consultees on rail developments. 
Influence on rail projects via the 
planning system. 
Other transport 
services and 
infrastructure 
Aviation and shipping  • Allocates funding for major 
transport schemes, services or 
funding competitions from 
devolved budget 
• Active travel infrastructure (e.g. 
cycling facilities) associated 
with trunk roads. 
• Some aspects of ports 
management devolved by 
Wales Act (2017) 
• Sets the policy framework for 
walking and cycling. 
• Wales Act (2017) gives Welsh 
Government power over taxi 
and private hire licensing. 
 
 
• Deliver transport projects, 
usually through third party 
contractors. 
• Infrastructure for pedestrians 
and cyclists. 
• Parking services. 
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Northern Ireland (see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-settlement-northern-ireland) 
Service 
UK Government (‘Excepted’ and 
‘reserved’ functions) 
Northern Ireland Executive Local Authorities 
Road network The Northern Ireland Executive has 
‘full legislative powers’ for transport 
including roads. 
• The Department for Infrastructure (DfI) has 
overall responsibility for transport policy and 
planning in Northern Ireland. These policies 
are delivered by TransportNI, a business unit 
within the DfI which is, in effect, the roads 
and public transport authority in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
 
Local authorities in Northern Ireland 
have no statutory responsibilities 
with regard to transport policy and 
planning. 
Bus services The Northern Ireland Executive has 
‘full legislative powers’ for transport 
including road transport. 
• The vast majority of public transport services 
are provided by the subsidiary companies of 
the Northern Ireland Transport Holding 
Company (NITHC) =- a statutory body (public 
corporation) established by the Transport 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 to oversee the 
provision of public transport in NI. The three 
subsidiary companies, Citybus (which 
operates Metro bus services), NI Railways 
and Ulsterbus, have operated under the 
overall brand-name of Translink since 1996, 
although the companies are separate legal 
entities.  
 
 
 
Local authorities in Northern Ireland 
have no statutory responsibilities 
with regard to transport policy or 
planning. 
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Rail services (incl. light 
rail) 
The Northern Ireland Executive has 
‘full legislative powers’ for transport 
including railways. 
The vast majority of public transport services 
are provided by the subsidiary companies of 
the Northern Ireland Transport Holding 
Company (NITHC) - a statutory body (public 
corporation) established by the Transport Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1967 to oversee the 
provision of public transport in NI. The three 
subsidiary companies, Citybus (which operates 
Metro bus services), NI Railways and Ulsterbus, 
have operated under the overall brand-name of 
Translink since 1996, although the companies 
are separate legal entities.  
Local authorities in Northern Ireland 
have no statutory responsibilities 
with regard to transport policy or 
planning. 
Other transport 
services and 
infrastructure 
Aviation and shipping are reserved to 
the UK Government. 
• DfI also has responsibility for vehicle 
registration, road safety and driver and 
vehicle licensing functions.  
• Allocates funding for major transport 
schemes, services or funding competitions 
from devolved budget 
• Active travel infrastructure (e.g. cycling 
facilities) associated with trunk roads. 
Sets the policy framework for walking and 
cycling. 
Local authorities in Northern Ireland 
have no statutory responsibilities 
with regard to transport policy or 
planning. 
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